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FAMILY TIES: A COMPARISON OF THE
CHANGING LEGAL DEFINITION OF
FAMILY IN SUCCESSION RIGHTS TO
RENT-REGULATED HOUSING IN THE
UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years the question of how to define "family" has
become increasingly controversial. Social practices have influ-
enced both the colloquial and the legal definitions of family.1
One of the areas in which the legal definition of family is cur-
rently disputed is in succession rights to rent-regulated housing.2
Frequently, the relevant statutory law states that "members of a
tenant's family"' may succeed to the tenancy upon the death of
a tenant. Therefore, defining who is a member of a tenant's fam-
ily has inspired heated debates between landlords and tenants in
a period in which the possession of a rent-regulated dwelling is
viewed as an important property right of the tenant.4
The legislatures and courts of both the United States and
Great Britain are being challenged to expand the legal definition
of "members of a tenant's family" in this area.5 This challenge
results from demands6 that the definition be expanded beyond
traditional, legally recognized relationships of blood, marriage,
and adoption.7 The traditional nuclear family - a breadwinner
husband, a wife who stays at home, and their minor children -
is no longer a valid reflection of the majority of families in either
country." Indeed, many "families" are composed of diverse rela-
1. Note, Developments in the Law: Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARv. L.
REv. 1508, 1603 (1989) [hereinafter Note, Sexual Orientation and the Law].
2. See, e.g., infra notes 131-54, 227-42 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 43-80, 176-78, 187-97 and accompanying text.
4. Note, All in the Family: Succession Rights and Rent Stabilized Apartments, 53
BROoxLYN L. REv. 213, 214 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Succession Rights]. "An apartment,
especially an 'affordable' one, is a valuable commodity ... a new type of wealth [is
created] by sealing in guaranteed security of possession." Id. at 243.
5. See infra notes 131-54, 227-42 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 131-54, 227-42 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 92, 235-36 and accompanying text.
8. In 1988 only 27%, or 24.6 million of the United States 91.1 million households
came under the traditional definition of a family. This is a dramatic drop from 1970
when 40% of American households were defined as traditional. N.Y. Times, May 28,
1989, at 6, col. 1. In April 1990 the Census Bureau made a major change in family catego-
ries, which reflects this shift. For the first time, couples who live together will be allowed
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tionships that include unmarried couples living together (homo-
sexual as well as relationships which are companionate and not
sexual), single-parent "families," foster "families," stepfamilies,
extended "families," and groups of unrelated individuals living
together who function as a family.9 The traditional nuclear fain-
to call themselves "unmarried partners." United States Census Form, D-1, 1990, U.S.
Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census; see also Isaacson, Should Gays Have Mar-
riage Rights?, Tim, Nov. 20, 1989, at 101, col. 1 [hereinafter Isaacson]. The divorce rate
in the United States has doubled in the last. 25 years; the level currently is one divorce
for every two marriages. N.Y. Times, May 28, 1989, at 6, col. 1; see also Hafen, The
Family as an Entity, 22 U. C. DAVIS L. REV. 865, 866 (1989) [hereinafter Hafen].
In 1987 a total of 44.1% of all households in Great Britain were composed of tradi-
tional nuclear families. London Times, Jan. 25, 1990, at 10, col. 8. As of 1989, the nuclear
family is continuing to decrease and accounted for a minority of households; single par-
ent families and more informal cohabitation arrangements constituted an increasing pro-
portion of households. Hudson, Lords Debate The Family, 139 NEw L.J. 1675 (Dec. 8,
1989). The ratio of marriages to divorce in Great Britain was three to one in 1989; Great
Britain has the highest divorce rate in the European Community. 86 LAw Soc'Y GAZErE
5 (Apr. 19, 1989).
9. These groups include the handicapped, the elderly, and the mentally ill. See
Korngold, Single Family Use Convenants: For Achieving a Balance Between Tradi-
tional Family Life and Individual Autonomy, 22 U. C. DAvis L. REV. 951, 952-53 (1989)
[hereinafter Korngold].
In this Note, the term "traditional family" is used interchangeably with "nuclear
family" to describe a family consisting of a husband, a wife, and their minor children.
Legally adopted children will fall under this definition. R. CLAYTON, THE FAMILY, MAR-
RIAGE, AND SOCIAL CHANGE 90 (1975) [hereinafter R. CLAYTON].
Extended family is defined as a family with at least one additional relationship not
usually included in the traditional or nuclear family context. For example, a grand-
mother living with the nuclear family makes the family an extended family. Id. A rela-
tionship that replaces one of the relationships included in the nuclear family is also con-
sidered an extended family in this Note. Thus, a grandmother who replaces a mother
falls within the definition of an extended family. See generally Moore v. City of E.
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (the definition of family is broadened to include an ex-
tended family consisting of a grandmother and her two grandsons).
In this Note, a kinship or kin-oriented family means a group of people who live
together or in close proximity, and who are all related by blood. See generally R. CLAY-
TON, supra, at 38-63.
"Functional equivalent" of a family means one or more surrogate parents and a
number of foster children living together in a stable, family-like existence. This defini-
tion is usually used in zoning situations to enable families with foster children and group
homes to come under the definition of family. Since group homes and foster families
serve to create a replacement family for victims of abuse and neglect, they do not detract
from the family and youth values that one-family residence zoning is intended to pro-
tect. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977); Baer v. Town of
Brookhaven, 73 N.Y.2d 942, 537 N.E.2d 619, 540 N.Y.S.2d 234 (1989); McMinn v. Town
of Oyster Bay, 66 N.Y.2d 544, 488 N.E.2d 1240, 498 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1985); Group House
of Port Washington, Inc. v. North Hempstead, 45 N.Y.2d 266, 380 N.E.2d 207, 408
N.Y.S.2d 377 (1978).
In this Note, all nontraditional and nonnuclear families, as described in the text, will
be referred to as diverse-relationship families. See Teitelbaum, Placing the Family in
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ily, however, is still seen by many to be a basic unit of social
organization and possibly an ideal form of family life.10
This Note begins by briefly examining the origin and evolu-
tion of the family from a sociological viewpoint. It then describes
the legal definition of family in succession rights to rent-regu-
lated housing in the statutory and case law of both the United
States and Great Britain. For purposes of this comparison, this
Note focuses on the jurisdiction of New York State, which has
the longest history of rent-regulated housing in the United
States. It compares and contrasts the current definitions in New
York State and Great Britain. This comparison illustrates that
in the last two decades, many areas of the United States appear
to be responding to both societal and political demands by dra-
matically increasing the rights- of tenants. Significantly, New
York State courts have recently recognized a broader definition
of family within the statutory law of succession rights to rent-
controlled housing."" Great Britain is currently heading in a dif-
ferent direction. After seventy years of legislation that gave te-
nants massive protection in the form of controlled rents and se-
cured tenure, Great Britain has recently enacted new legislation
that greatly diminishes these rights, including succession rights
to statutory tenancies. 2 This Note argues that the legal defini-
tion of "members of a tenant's family" should reflect the reality
of twentieth century family life. It is maintained that this defini-
tion should recognize alternative "relationships that meet the
Context, 22 U. C. DAVIs L. REv. 801, 825-27 (1989) [hereinafter Teitelbaum].
10. Note, Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 1, at 1604 n.1 (citing Note,
The Necessity for State Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage: Constitutional Require-
ments and Evolving Notions of Family, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN's L.J. 134, 134 n.1 (1987-
88)); see generally Teitelbaum, supra note 9, at 809-12; see also Hafen, supra note 8, at
905. An institution is "an organized system of social relationships ... that is pervasively
implemented in society and that serves certain basic needs of society." R. CLAYTON,
supra note 9, at 19. There are at least five basic institutions: family, education, econom-
ics, government, and religion. Id.
11. See infra notes 228, 234-36 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 63-80 and accompanying text. It can be speculated that these
varying changes reflect the differences in each country's divergent historical and cultural
traditions. The United States has a population largely composed of the descendants of
immigrants who came "to avoid one type of life and to live some other type of life." D.
SNOWMAN, BRITAIN & AMERICA: AN INTERPRETATION OF THEm CULTURE 1945-1975, at 26
(1977) [hereinafter D. SNOWMAN]. Therefore, there are many variations within the popu-
lation that have contributed to the diversity of life-styles and beliefs to be found within
the country. The United States vast geographical variations have also added to this di-
versity. But Great Britain, uninvaded for 900 years, has a far longer history, a "more
traditional culture, and a more compact and homogeneous society." Id. at 23-24, 26, 80.
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human need for closeness, trust and love in ways that may jar
some conventional sensibilities[.]' 1 Finally, this Note suggests
further actions regarding the succession rights to rent-regulated
housing. It recommends that diverse-relationship families be
recognized as having such rights by the legislatures of both the
United States and Great Britain, and that a practical and flexi-
ble approach be used in determining members of families. Oth-
erwise, courts may shape future family choices, rather than leav-
ing such choices to individuals. 14
II. THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE FAMILY
The European family of the Middle Ages 5 was consanguine,
based on the importance of blood relationships."6 It centered on
13. L. TRME, AmRmcAN CONSTrrUvONAL LAW 1418 (2d ed. 1988).
14. See Korngold, supra note 9, at 954-55; see also infra notes 267-73 and accompa-
nying text.
15. The time period of the Middle Ages is from 1500-1700. See Stone, The Rise of
the Nuclear Family in Early Modern England: The Patriarchal Stage, THE FAMILY IN
HISTORY 13-14 (C. E. Rosenberg ed. 1975) [hereinafter Stone].
Our earliest ancestors lived together in small, communal groups. How the groups
were organized and what sort of relationships were formed within the groups is un-
known. Whether any sort of family existed in these primeval living groups remains
largely conjectural. Therefore, the focus on the origin of the family must begin where
there is adequate information to draw conclusions. Weaver, The Search for Our Ances-
tors, 168 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC 560, 615 (Nov. 1985). It is speculated that the earliest family
unit was that of a mother and child. In the primeval world there was probably little to
hold a man and a woman together on a permanent basis. Our ancestors were also not
aware of the concept of biological paternity, but since infants and small children remain
dependent on their mothers for an extended period of time, it seems likely that the
mother-child relationship could be the basic building block of the family. R. CLAYTON,
supra note 9, at 39-42.
Although the information that anthropologists and archaeologists have been able to
gather about these living groups is slim and indirect, archaeologist have found evidence
that these early ancestors had strong social bonds within the living group. For instance,
members of a group buried their dead and took care of those who were injured or who
could no longer care for themselves. This shows that these early men and women had a
social conscience, were altruistic, and cared about the other members of the living group.
Putman, The Search for Modern Hunters, 174 NAT'L GEOGR"HiC 439, 452 (Oct. 1988).
Indeed, the complete answer to the origin of the family will probably never be
known because "a social institution such as the family is poorly reflected in the archeo-
logical record ... [it] ... leaves no artifact ... most aspects of ancient family patterns
are unrecorded. They simply were not interesting enough at the time." R. CLAYTON,
supra note 9, at 39 (quoting D. SCHuLz, THE CHANGING FAMILY 90 (1972)).
16. Stone, supra note 15, at 14. Consanguinity still remains an important element of
the legal definition of family. It is the basis of incest statutes in both the United States
and Great Britain, as well as everywhere else. "Marriages between brother and sister,
parent and child, or grandparent and grandchild are universally prohibited." Note, The
Legal Family - A Definitional Analysis, 13 J. FAM. L. 781, 783 (1973-74) [hereinafter
Note, The Legal Family].
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the male line, giving the father or head of the family the greatest
authority.1 One's status in life was derived from one's role in
the family."" This type of family could be described as a group of
people who lived together or close to one another and who were
related by blood.' The outer boundaries of this family group,
where the blood relationships became attenuated, were weak
and permeable.20 These kinship or consanguine families were
linked together by the mutual needs and obligations of the indi-
vidual members. 1 They revolved around economic support
rather than affective bonding.22 In a kin-oriented family, ties
formed by marriage were weaker than those based on blood
relationships.23
A different sort of family slowly started to evolve between
1500 and 1700.24 The ties of blood relationships began to weaken
and the marital relationship grew stronger as it became more
common to marry for love or companionship rather than eco-
nomic necessity.25 As a result, affective bonds tying the conjugal
17. Stone, supra note 15, at 13-14. The evidence is that families have more fre-
quently centered on the male line rather than the female line. R. CLAYTON, supra note 9,
at 43.
18. M. GLENDON, THE NEW FAMmy AND THE NEW PROPERTY 12 (1981) [hereinafter
M. GLENDON]. "A person's class is a group of people with whom he or she is identified;
status, on the other hand, is more an individual matter, a question of the esteem or
praise that a person receives or feels entitled to." D. SNOWMAN, supra note 12, at 131.
19. See generally L. STONE, THE FAMILY, SEX AND MARRAGE IN ENGLAND (1500-
1800) (1977) [hereinafter L. STONE]. "Kinship" families probably included servants. Id.
at 26-27. Indeed, the Latin word familia, from which family is derived, originally meant
the servants of one master. Note, The Legal Family, supra note 16, at 781.
20. M. GLENDON, supra note 18, at 12.
21. M. GLENDON, supra note 18, at 12-13.
22. M. GLENDON, supra note 18, at 12.
23. Marriages were usually made for economic reasons and were arranged by par-
ents. Land was the principle form of wealth at the time and keeping it within the family
was very important. Marriages were arranged in order to increase land, or to bring in
capital to help support the land. See generally L. STONE, supra note 19, at 86-89.
24. Stone, supra note 15, at 13.
25. The emphasis on land as the chief source of wealth began to shift towards an
emphasis on capital. There was an increasing separation between the family and econom-
ics; economic functions that held the family together decreased. One of the reasons for
the shift from a kin-oriented family to a conjugal family was the increasing geographic
mobility of people at this time. This new mobility may have contributed more than any
other factor to the shift; because more people were traveling and leaving their original
homes, it became almost impossible for the kinship family to retain its strength over its
members, some of whom became transients without deep connections to their families.
Stone, supra note 15, at 21-23. Another reason was that people also began looking for
mates beyond their own kin. M. GLENDON, supra note 18, at 12. All of these reasons were
interconnected and had an impact on each other.
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unit increased.2" There were also shifts in values; the ideal of
loyalty to kin was being replaced by loyalty to spouse and loy-
alty to the state.2 7
This transitional stage in the evolution of the family even-
tually gave way to the more companionate and egalitarian nu-
clear family of the nineteenth century.28 There was a change on
a global scale in the freedom to choose one's mate.2 9 The central
zone of the family became the husband and the wife, and the
structure and roles of a family became more important than its
functions.30
At this point in time, the family became a traditional nu-
clear model, consisting of a father, a mother, and their minor
children. 1 This family was marked by the mutual attraction be-
tween the husband and wife, the close parent-child relation-
ships, and the weakness of the associations with kin.32 It was a
close-knit, inwardly-turning family.33 The nuclear family was not
merely a unit of cohabitation, but also the focus of psychological
satisfaction, loyalty, and devotion.3
The nuclear family remained the predominant type of fam-
ily until the early 1960s, when, as the result of many factors, it
began to wane." The economic interdependence of family mem-
bers decreased.3 6 Capital was no longer the principle form of
wealth; for most people, employment and work-related benefits,
like pensions, became the major forms of property.3 7 These new
26. M. GLENDON, supra note 18, at 12.
27. Stone, supra note 15, at 23-24. "As society became more dense, more complex
and more organized, there developed a series of semi-public bodies, town authorities,
parish overseers.. . which took over many of the functions previously performed by the
kin and by the family." Id. at 21.
28. M. GLENDON, supra note 18, at 12.
29. R. CLAYTON, supra note 9, at 44.
30. The functions of a modem, diverse relationship family "include: maintaining the
physical health and the safety of members; providing conditions for emotional growth;
helping to shape a belief system; and encouraging shared responsibility." N.Y. Times,
May 28, 1989, at 6, col. 1. R. CLAYTON, supra note 9, at 90-91.
31. Although the parents are not equally powerful, the father's absolute authority
has begun to weaken, especially as women entered the work force. M. GLENDON, supra
note 18, at 17, 20.
32. M. GLENDON, supra note 18, at 12; see also Hafen, supra note 8, at 870.
33. M. GLENDON, supra note 18, at 14.
34. Stone, supra note 15, at 25. See also N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1989, at C1, col. 6.
35. See supra note 8.
36. M. GLENDON, supra note 18, at 12.
37. See generally Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) [hereinafter
Reich]. Indeed, it is estimated that up to 40% of a worker's compensation comes in the
form of fringe benefits, including health insurance benefits. Isaacson, supra note 8, at
[Vol. XVII:
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forms of property also became the basis of status; one's occupa-
tion or, viewed in a negative light, one's dependency on the gov-
ernment became one's status.38
Both blood ties and marriage ties have greatly weakened
in the modern, diverse-relationship family. The individual is
freed from the network of both kin-oriented family and the con-
jugal family.39 Marriage ties are easily broken; it is relatively
easy to detach from one's spouse.40 Membership in the diverse-
relationship family can be described as fluid, detachable, and in-
terchangeable.41 Just as companionate marriages and loyalty to
state threatened the kin-oriented family, individual freedom of
choice now threatens the nuclear family.42
III. BRITISH STATUTORY AND CASE LAW
A. Statutory Law
1. Member of the Tenant's Family
In response to housing shortages during World War I, Great
Britain enacted the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest
(War Restrictions) Act of 1915.41 This act was supposed to be a
temporary wartime measure.44 In 1920, however, the Increase of
Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act of 1920 (Rent Re-
101, col. 1.
38. See Reich, supra note 37, at 785. American society has always been less strati-
fied than British society; opportunities for social mobility are often believed to be more
extensive in the United States than in Great Britain. Therefore, there are more per-
ceived social paths in the United States. D. SNOWMAN, supra note 12, at 109.
39. See generally Hafen, supra note 8, at 876-78; see also M. GLENDON, supra note
18, at 13.
40. M. GLENDON, supra note 18, at 12, 19. This is reflected in the high divorce rate
in both countries, which began to rise in the 1970s. Currently, one out of every two
marriages ends in divorce in the United States; and one out of every three marriages
ends in divorce in Great Britain. See Gilvarry, Divorce Law - Solicitors Air Some
Doubts, 87 LAW Soc'y GAzETrE 5 (Nov. 7, 1990); see also supra note 8.
41. M. GLENDON, supra note 18, at 13.
42. Stone, supra note 15, at 23-24.
43. Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (War Restrictions) Act, 1915, 5 & 6 Geo.
5, ch. 97. M. HARWOOD, MODERN ENGLISH LAND LAW 137 (1982) [hereinafter M. HAR-
WOOD]. High rents were being charged in areas where munitions factories were located,
and the influx of workers caused an increased demand for housing. The President of the
Local Government Board stated when the bill was introduced into the House of Com-
mons: "[the rent-raising] has produced a very deep feeling of bitterness and resentment
... the minority who happen to hold houses, are taking advantage of wartime to exploit
the war for their own benefit." Id.
44. See Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (War Restrictions) Act, 1915, 5 & 6
Geo. 5, ch. 97.
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strictions Act)45 was passed because of continued housing
shortages and societal demands for greater protection of
tenants.
46
The Rent Restrictions Act controlled rents and guaranteed
security of tenure for houses, flats, and other dwellings that were
valued below a certain amount.47 The phrase "member of the
tenant's family" was first used in the Rent Restrictions Act in
the context of succeeding to a statutory tenancy.48 Nevertheless,
the Rent Restrictions Act failed to give a definition of this
phrase. This lack of definition continued through succeeding
statutory law regarding rights to succeed to statutory tenancies,
leaving the task of defining "member of the tenant's family" to
the courts.49
There were many further changes in landlord-tenant law,
but all the succeeding legislation was finally consolidated in the
Rent Act of 1977 (Rent Act).50 The previous statutory changes
had fluctuated between decontrolling many of the larger dwell-
ings and preventing new tenancies from being controlled,5 1 and
returning the same dwellings under the rent control laws.2
These various statutory changes account for the profusion of
dates. 3
45. Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act (Rent Restrictions
Act), 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5, ch. 17 [hereinafter Rent Restrictions Act]. The Rent Restric-
tions Act provides for succession to a statutory tenancy by: "the widow of a tenant...
who was residing with him at the time of his death, or, where a tenant ... leaves no
widow or is a woman, such member of the tenant's family so residing as aforesaid as may
be decided in default of agreement by the county court." Id. at § 12(1)(g).
46. M. HARwoOD, supra note 43, at 137-38.
47. M. HARWOOD, supra note 43, at 136-38.
48. When a tenant's contractual tenancy has been determined and the tenant re-
tains possession by virtue of the act, the tenant has a statutory tenancy which continues
as long as the tenant occupies the dwelling. A statutory tenancy cannot be assigned; it
cannot pass at death by will or intestate, but it can pass to the tenant's spouse (if living
with the tenant at time of death), or, if there is no spouse, to any member of the de-
ceased tenant's family who has lived with the tenant for at least six months. The tenancy
of the successor is a statutory tenancy by succession. M. HAR WOOD, supra note 43, at 141.
49. Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5,
ch. 17; Rent and Mortgage Interest Restrictions Act, 1923, 13 & 14 Geo. 5, ch. 32; Rent
and Mortgage Interest Restrictions (Amendment) Act, 1933, 23 & 24 Geo. 5, ch. 32; In-
crease of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1935, 25 & 26 Geo. 5, ch. 13;
Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, ch. 26;
Rent and Mortgage Interest Restrictions Act, 1939, 2 & 3 Geo. 6, ch. 71; Rent Act, 1968,
ch. 23, amended by Rent Act, 1974, ch. 51.
50. Rent Act, 1977, ch. 42, § 2(1)(b).
51. See Rent Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, ch. 25, § 11.
52. See Rent Act, 1965, ch. 75, §§ 1, 10, 11, sched. 1, para. 3.
53. R. MEGARRY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 1103 (1984).
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The Rent Act also fails to clearly define who is considered a
member of a tenant's family.5 4 Like the original Rent Restric-
tions Act, it provides two instances in which a person may suc-
ceed to a statutory tenancy. A surviving spouse may become a
statutory tenant if two requirements are met: residency in the
dwelling immediately before the death of the tenant and occu-
pancy of the dwelling as a residence.55 If there is no surviving
spouse or if the spouse does not qualify under the provisions of
the statute, 5 then the tenancy can pass to a member of the orig-
inal tenant's family under two circumstances. First, the family
member must have resided with the tenant at the time of the
tenant's death, and second, the family member must have lived
there for a period of six months immediately prior to the ten-
ant's death.57 This lack of a statutory definition of who is a
member of a tenant's family has given rise to litigation request-
ing an interpretation of the phrase.58
In contrast to the Rent Act, the Housing Act of 1980, which
is now consolidated in the Housing Act of 1985 (Housing Act),59
defined the meaning of "member of the original family." The
Housing Act is legislation that only affects tenants of public
housing. Until the enactment of the Housing Act, if a tenant's
landlord was the government or a public agency, there were no
54. Rent Act, 1977, ch. 42, sched. 1, para. 3.
55. Rent Act, 1977, ch. 42, sched. 1, para. 2.
56. Rent Act, 1977, ch. 42, sched. 1, para. 2.
57. Rent Act, 1977, ch. 42, sched. 1, para. 3. The question of succession by a family
member often turns on whether the residency requirement has been met prior to the
original tenant's death. Family members will often spend time at the home of an elderly
relative during a final illness, and it is not always clear whether they have moved in or
are still residing somewhere else at the time of the tenant's death. In Hildebrand v.
Moon, [1989] C.L.Y.B. § 2125, a daughter returned home to nurse her mother. At the
time of her mother's death, the daughter had met the requisite residency requirement,
but she still owned her own flat. The court of appeal looked at both the daughter's inten-
tion to sell her flat as well as the evidence of her residency at her mother's home in
determining that the daughter was entitled to succeed to the tenancy.
A landlord may have no wish to evict an elderly tenant who has resided in a dwelling
for many years; however, what the landlord does not want is to find that the protected
tenancy has been succeeded to by a member of the tenant's family who will enjoy many
more years of secured tenancy. Lewis, Statutory Tenants by Succession, 139 Naw L.J.
1353 (Oct. 6, 1989); see also South Northamptonshire District Council v. Power [1987] 1
W.L.R. 1433; [1987] 3 All E.R. 831 (C.A.), petition allowed, [1988] 1 W.L.R. 319, (H.L.
(E.)) (the male partner of an unmarried couple fell outside the relevant provision be-
cause he did not meet the residency requirement; "resides" connotes a connection with
the property and not merely a close relationship with the tenant).
58. See, e.g., infra notes 81-84, 116-19 and accompanying text.
59. Housing Act, 1980, ch. 51, § 50, now Housing Act, 1985, ch. 68, § 87.
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laws governing rent increases or protecting a tenant's security of
tenure. Like the Rent Act, the Housing Act provides for two
ways in which a person can succeed to a statutory tenancy; the
residency requirement, however, is for a longer period. A resid-
ing spouse or other member of the tenant's family who had re-
sided with the tenant for a period of twelve months prior to the
tenant's death, may succeed to the tenancy.60 A member of a
tenant's family is defined as a spouse or a blood relative, or a
person who lived with the tenant as "husband and wife."'" In
the case of public tenancies, the only way an unmarried
cohabitee is able to establish a family connection is if a "hus-
band and wife" relationship is shown. Despite this statutory def-
inition, however, there is still room for debate regarding who is a
member of the original tenant's family.6 2
2. The Housing Act of 1988
The regulations relating to succession to tenancies protected
by the Rent Act have been changed in favor of landlords by the
provisions of the Housing Act of 1988 (1988 Act) that went into
effect on January 15, 1989.63 The provisions of the 1988 Act pro-
vide sweeping, significant changes in the rules regulating tenan-
cies protected since the passage of the original Rent Restrictions
Act and successive Rent Acts.' However, the new regulations do
not affect tenancies created before January 15, 1989, and contain
certain transitional provisions. 5
Under this new legislation, landlords are able to regain pos-
session of dwellings more easily. Controls on rents are also abol-
ished.6 In essence, the 1988 Act separates rent control and se-
60. Housing Act, 1980, ch. 51, § 50, now Housing Act, 1985, ch. 68, § 87.
61. Housing Act, 1980, ch. 51, § 50(3), now Housing Act, 1985, ch. 68, § 113(1). See
Harrogate Borough Council v. Simpson, [1985] 2 F.L.R.91; [1986] 16 Fam. 359. On ap-
peal the defendant argued that it was the intention of Parliament that these provisions(Housing Act, 1980, ch. 51, §§ 30, 50 now consolidated in Housing Act, 1985, ch. 68, §§
87, 113) should apply to unions that had the appearance of two people living together in
a form of matrimonial state. The appeal was dismissed, and the court concluded that if
the legislature had wished homosexual relationships to be brought within the purposes of
the housing legislation, it would have clearly stated so. Id. See also infra notes 135-43
and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 131-38 and accompanying text.
63. Housing Act, 1988, ch. 50, § 141(3).
64. Webb, A Guide to the Housing Act - I, 139 N.w L.J. 252 (Feb. 24, 1989).
65. Storey, Property Points: the Housing Bill 1988, 85 LAw Soc'y GAZETTE 30 (Mar.
16, 1988) [hereinafter Storey].
66. See Housing Act, 1988, ch. 50.
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curity of tenure.67 The interdependency of rent control and
security of tenure is a basic principle of the Rent Act and was
part of previous legislation regarding housing regulations; the ef-
fectiveness of rent-regulations law relies on this interdepen-
dency."' With the passage of the 1988 Act, this interdependency
has been eliminated.
The two main purposes of the government's introduction of
these new forms of tenancies are to produce rents that are genu-
ine market rate rents and to decontrol rent-regulated housing.69
Much of the protection previously given to residential tenants
under the Rent Act, however, has been removed, both in terms
of security of tenure and of rent control. 0 The 1988 Act replaces
security of tenure with a new scheme of assured tenancies.7 1 De-
spite the reassuring name, assured tenancies offer less protection
for tenants than the Rent Act 2.7  Although tenants' rights have
been reduced in most respects, there are some provisions that
enhance the rights of tenants; these include antiharassment reg-
ulations, improvement grants, and obligations to repair
statutes.73
Under the 1988 Act, spouses will inherit as before, and in
addition, a person living with the tenant as a spouse,74 if the
67. The purpose of the new law is to give landlords the choice of giving a lease on
either an assured tenancy basis with a freely negotiated 'market' rent, but security of
tenure; or on the shorthold basis with no security of tenure beyond the original fixed
term, but giving either party the right to go to the rent assessment committee for regis-
tration of an appropriate shorthold term. See Housing Act, 1988, ch. 50, § 20. See also
Rodgers, Assured Shorthold Tenure: Long Term Insecurity, 86 LAw Soc'Y GuARDAN
GAZETTE 34 (Mar. 2, 1989) [hereinafter Rodgers].
68. Rodgers, supra note 67, at 34.
69. Kenny, The Housing Act 1988: Assured Tenancies, 86 LAw Soc'y GAZETTr 19
(Feb. 1, 1989).
70. Storey, supra note 65, at 30.
71. It has been noted that:
This "new style" assured tenancy is a development from, and redefinition of,
the "old style" assured tenancies under the Housing Act 1980 - which would
. . . be converted to new style assured tenancies under the Bill. It is perhaps
unfortunate that the Bill uses the existing expression "assured tenancy" for
what is really a new concept.
Storey, supra note 65, at 30.
72. Storey, supra note 65, at 30; see also infra note 78 and accompanying text. Not
all tenancies granted on or after January 15, 1989 are necessarily assured tenancies; the
circumstances that create a Rent Act protected tenancy, however, have to be exceptional.
Housing Act, 1988, ch. 50, §§ 34(1)(b) & (c).
73. Housing Act, 1988, ch. 50, §§ 19, 130, 131.
74. Housing Act, 1988, ch. 50, sched. 4, para. 2. "[A] person who was living with the
original tenant as his or her wife or husband shall be treated as the spouse of the original
tenant." Id. It may be assumed that this extension of the normal meaning of "spouse"
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dwelling is considered the main residence, will become the statu-
tory tenant after the tenant's death. The statute does not con-
tain a provision for children to succeed.76 Other members of the
tenant's family can no longer take a statutory tenancy by succes-
sion.77 Statutory successions other than to a spouse (or an
equivalent) of the original tenant may still occur, but the mem-
ber of the tenant's family is only entitled to an assured ten-
ancy.78 An assured tenancy either provides rent control or secur-
ity of tenure, but not both.
Therefore, the conditions for succession for a member of a
tenant's family have been changed and narrowed. A spouse or an
unmarried partner of the opposite sex is protected, but a mem-
ber of the tenant's family must be residing in the house with the
tenant at the time of death and must have lived there for the
previous two years in order to become the statutory tenant.79
Prior to the 1988 Act, the residency requirement for a member
of the tenant's family was only six months.80 In addition, the
1988 Act provides no protection for homosexual couples or other
will apply only to couples of different sexes. See, e.g., Harrogate, [1986] 16 Fano. 359. An
unmarried cohabitee, however, is now included as a spouse; he or she does not have to
prove to be a member of the tenant's family.
75. The provisions for succession to Rent Act protected tenancies are amended to
the following effect by Housing Act, 1988, ch. 50, sched. 4 (1988 Act):
(i) Succession takes place only to a person residing with the tenant 'in the
dwelling-house' (sched. 4, para. 3(a)).
(ii) Persons other than the spouse must satisfy this residence requirement
for two years before the death (sched. 4, para. 3(b)). Where the death occurs
within 18 months of the provisions coming into force, providing there was six-
months residence before that date the two-year period is deemed to be satis-
fied (sched. 4, para. 3(d)).
(ill) When a successor dies then there is a succession only if the two-year
period is satisfied (sched. 4, para. 6).
(iv) A successor other than the spouse of the original tenant becomes enti-
tled to an assured periodic tenancy as provided in § 39 (sched. 4, para. 3(c)).
76. See generally Housing Act, 1988, ch. 50, sched. 4.
77. See Housing Act, 1988, ch. 50, § 39 & sched. 4. A landlord may charge a free
market rent for an assured tenancy. Housing Act, 1988, ch. 50, § 20.
78. Housing Act, 1988, ch. 50, sched. 4, para. 3(c).
79. Housing Act, 1988, ch. 50, sched. 4, para. 3(b).
80. See Rodgers, supra note 67, at 34. Although the six-month residency require-
ment was lengthened by the 1988 Act, a reduction had been made from a five-year resi-
dency requirement, which was proposed when the 1988 Act was first published. Id.
There are transitional provisions in the 1988 Act that apply to cases in which a
potential successor was in residence before the act came into force. Also, on the death of
a first successor, a person who was a member of the family of both the original tenant
and first successor's family, and who satisfied the two years' residency requirement, can
also become an assured tenant by succession. Id.
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diverse-relationship families. It will be hard for many family
members to meet these stricter residency requirements.
B. Case Law
1. The "Ordinary and Popular" Meaning of Family
The lack of definition of "member of the tenant's family" in
the Rent Restrictions Act and in subsequent statutory law in-
volving succession rights has forced courts to supply an interpre-
tation of this phrase. In one of the first cases to clarify the stat-
ute's language, Brock v. Wollams,s1 a daughter of a deceased
tenant who had never been legally adopted was entitled to re-
main in possession of a house that fell within the scope of the
Rent Restrictions Act. Although she had never been legally
adopted by the tenant and his wife, she had lived with them
from a young age until her marriage.8 2 After three years of mar-
riage, the daughter returned to her childhood home and took
care of her father until his death.83 The court found that the
term "family" in the Rent Restrictions Act should be used in the
"ordinary, popular sense" 4 of the word and therefore it included
an adopted child, whether or not there had been a legal
adoption.
The Brock court did not have the help of many prior deci-
sions to "[throw] any light upon the meaning to be given the
word 'family' in [the Rent Restrictions Act], ' s however, there
were two earlier decisions that the court found helpful. In the
first decision a court had determined that a husband of a de-
ceased statutory tenant was a member of the tenant's family. 6
81. [1949] 2 K.B. 388; [1949] 1 All E.R. 715.
82. Brock, [1949] 2 K.B. at 388; [1949] 1 All E.R. at 715.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 394; [1949] 1 All E.R. at 717.
85. Id. at 393; [1949] 1 All E.R. at 717.
86. Salter v. Lask, [1925] 1 K.B. 584, 132 [1925] L.T.R. 830. Section 12(1)(g) of the
Rent Restrictions Act, amended 1923, provides that
[Tihe expression "tenant" includes the widow of a tenant... who was resid-
ing with him at the time of his death, or, where a tenant ... leaves no widow
or is a woman, such member of the tenant's family so residing as aforesaid as
may be decided in default of agreement by the county court for not less than
six months immediately before the death.
Rent Restrictions Act, § 12(1)(g). After deciding that a husband comes within the mean-
ing of the words of section 12(1)(g) of the Rent Restrictions Act, the court stated that at
some future time, a limit might have to be put on the words "tenant's family," and
"whether they are equivalent to 'household' or whether they are limited as meaning
blood relations, and in either case what members of the class respectively are indicated."
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The second case held that brothers and sisters of a deceased ten-
ant, living with her at the time of her death, fell within the
meaning of the word family.8 7 The Brock court reasoned that
they could interpret family in a similar way as these earlier cases
did; the court gave family its ordinary, popular meaning and did
not use it as a technical, legal term.88 Indeed, Lord Cohen said:
"the question the county court judge should have asked himself
was this: [w]ould an ordinary man, addressing his mind to the
question whether Mrs. Wollams was a member of the family or
not, have answered 'Yes' or 'No'?" 89
This ordinary man interpretation of the definition of family
was echoed in many subsequent decisions regarding succession
to a statutory tenancy. In Gammans v. Ekins ° a man who had
lived with a woman (the statutory tenant) for twenty years and
who had also adopted her name and posed as her husband, but
who had never been legally married to her, was found not to be a
member of the tenant's family within the ordinary popular sense
of that word in the Rent Restrictions Act. 1 Although the court
noted that consanguinity was not a prerequisite of membership
in another's family, it decided that prior decisions had limited
membership of the tenant's family to three types of relation-
ships: (1) children (including adopted children) of the tenant;
(2) legitimate marriages; and (3) in loco parentis situations.92
The Gammans court determined that the law had not extended
the definition of a member of a tenant's family beyond these
categories.93
The Gammans decision had strong moral overtones; because
the relationship had been a sexual one, the court felt that a per-
[1925] 1 K.B. at 587, 132 L.T.R. at 831.
87. Price v. Gould, [1930] 143 L.T.R. 333. After first recognizing that the primary
meaning of family is children, the court relied on Sum v. Teed, [1870] 23 L.T. 303, L.
Rep. 9 Eq. 622 (a case involving the exact scope of the word family within the context of
a will). In Sum, the court held that family could be extended beyond children and be-
yond the statutory next of kin. As a result, the Price court determined that the word
family could include brothers and sisters of the deceased tenant. The court then stated
that the meaning of family should be a flexible and wide term.
88. Brock, [1949] 2 K.B. at 394; [1949] 1 All E.R. at 718. The court also discussed
whether it was the intention of the legislature to protect servants and lodgers and de-
cided that this would be unlikely. Id.
89. Id.; [1949] 1 All E.R. at 718.
90. [1950] 2 K.B. 328; [19501 2 All E.R. 140.
91. Gammans, [1950] 2 K.B. at 330; [1950] 2 All E.R. at 143; Increase of Rent and
Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5, ch. 17, § 12(1)(g).
92. Gammans, [1950] 2 K.B. at 331; [1950] 2 All E.R. at 141.
93. Id.; [1950] 2 All E.R. at 141.
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son should not be able to acquire a "status of irremovability" by
"living ... in sin."94 There were no children from the relation-
ship, however, and the court suggested that the presence of chil-
dren could have been significant in determining whether the
man had been a member of the family.
95
The three types of relationships noted by Gammans were
generally followed for a number of years by the courts as criteria
for defining a family. Nonetheless, because the interpretation
used by the courts for the definition of family was vague and
imprecise, subsequent decisions did not always appear to follow
the same reasoning as the earlier ones. For example, two married
sons of a statutory tenant who were living with their mother,
along with their wives, were regarded as members of the tenant's
family. " A niece by marriage of a statutory tenant, who had as-
sumed, by her conduct, a "filial character," was also found to be
a member of the tenant's family because of special circum-
stances.97 The court noted that how the parties acted together
should be considered in making a judgment. In contrast, two
first cousins of a statutory tenant who were living with her at
the time of her death, and who had been living with her for
twenty-nine -years, were found not to be members of her fam-
ily.9s In this case, the circumstances were not found to be spe-
cial; the court stated that it was reluctant to extend the meaning
of family to relations of every degree, and therefore essentially
replace the word family in the Rent Restrictions Act with the
94. Id. at 337; [1950] 2 All E.R. at 144.
95. Id. at 331; [1950] 2 All E.R. at 142. Lord Jenkins stated that:
[A]s soon as children of two such parties, or one of them, come into question,
there may be said to be de facto an actual family, consisting of children and
the natural parent or parents of those children. It is then, I think, easy to see
how the children could properly be brought within the expression "family" ac-
cording to the ordinary and popular meaning of the word.
Id. at 332; [1950] 2 All E.R. at 142. The Gammans court referred to Jones v. Trueman
([1949] unreported, C.L.Y.B. § 3385), where a cohabiting couple with children was held
to be a family.
96. Standingford v. Probert, [1950] 1 K.B. 377; [1949] 2 All E.R. 861. This case did
not involve succession to a tenancy. Here, the landlord claimed possession of the house
to which the Rent Restrictions Act applied, and he had to offer alternative accommoda-
tion to the tenant that was suitable to the tenant's family. Id.
97. Jones v. Whitehill, [1950] 2 K.B. 204; [1950] 1 All E.R. 71. The court noted that
the existence of a family relationship is not always enough to make the surviving person
a member of the deceased tenant's family. The manner in which the parties acted is also
to be taken into account. Id.
98. Langdon v. Horton, [1951] 1 K.B. 666; [1951] 1 All E.R. 60.
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word relations."9
As it became more socially acceptable in the 1950s for
couples to live together without being legally married, a fourth
category of relationships was found to be protected by the Rent
Restrictions Act.100 In Hawes v. Evenden'0' a woman who had
cohabited with a man by whom she had had two children was
held to be a member of his family, and therefore entitled to suc-
cession under the Rent Restrictions Act. 102 In Gammans the
question of whether the existence of children made a difference
had been left open; here, it appears that the presence of children
did make a difference in determining that the inhabitants con-
stituted a family.1 0 3
2. Dyson Holdings: A Societal Change in Values
Dyson Holdings Ltd. v. Fox was a decision that took into
account modern morality and social reality. A woman who had
lived with a man for over forty years without marrying him nor
bearing him children was found to be a member of his family
and allowed to succeed him as a statutory tenant. 05 This court
defined the "common man" standard by stating that the word
family should be used in the sense that would be attributed to it
by the ordinary man in the street at the time relevant to the
decision of the particular case. 06
99. Id. at 669; [1951] 1 All E.R. at 60. In Langdon, Sir Evershed quoted Shake-
speare in an attempt to clarify the meaning of the common and popular standard: "the
word 'family' is used here, to borrow the words used of the soldier in King Henry V, in a
sense, base, common and popular[.]" Id. at 669; [1951] 1 All E.R. at 60. Pistol, address-
ing King Henry: "[A]rt thou officer? Or art thou base, common and popular?" W.
SHAKSPEARE, KING HENRY V, Act IV, sc. 1.
100. See infra notes 104-106 and accompanying text.
101. [1953] 1 W.L.R. 1169; [1953] 2 All E.R. 737.
102. Id. at 1171; [1953] 2 All E.R. at 738.
103. Tinkham v. Perry, [1951] 1 K.B. 547; [1951] 1 All E.R. 249 (C.A.). In contrast
to Hawes, Tinkham, which had similar facts - a woman who had lived with a man in an
unmarried state and who had had two children with him - was decided differently. It
appears that the distinguishing factor between these two cases was that the man in
Tinkham had already been married (his wife had abandoned him), so he did leave a
widow. In Hawes, Lord Somervell states that he is applying the test indicated by Lord
Cohen in Brock: would a common man view this woman as a member of the tenant's
family. Id. at 1170-71; [1951] 2 All E.R. at 738. It is not clear, however, that a common
man would not also think that the woman and two children in Tinkham could be seen as
members of the tenant's famny.
104. [1976] Q.B. 503; [1975] 3 W.L.R. 744; [1975] 3 All E.R. 1030 (C.A.).
105. Id., Rent Act, 1965, ch. 75, sched. 1, para. 3.
106. Dyson Holdings, [1976] Q.B. at 508; [1975] 3 W.L.R. at 747; [1975] 3 All E.R.
1030.
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The court looked to both Gammans and Hawes for guid-
ance and decided that it made no sense to consider an unmar-
ried woman who has lived with a man as his wife for many years
as a member of the tenant's family only if she has children by
him.10 7 Lord Denning felt that this was a ridiculous contention
which should be rejected by the court.10 He felt that the court
should not be absolutely bound by a previous decision when the
decision can no longer be supported.10 9 Lord Denning felt that
the lapse of time and the change in social conditions made the
previous decision of Gammans no longer applicable. 10 Lord
Denning also decided the case on more conventional grounds by
determining that Gammans had been wrongly decided."' He
noted that the House of Lords had decided that when an act
uses an ordinary word in its popular meaning as distinct from its
legal meaning, it is for the tribunal of fact to decide whether
that popular meaning covers the case in hand." 2 Lord Denning
also addressed the importance of having an ordinary word such
as family applied by each tribunal in the same manner. 1 3 He
stated that it would be intolerable for each court to apply it in a
different way. 1 4 Therefore, in Dyson Holdings he gave a definite
ruling.115
107. Id. at 508-09; [1975] 3 W.L.R. at 747-48. Lord Denning illustrated his point by
contrasting two couples, one whose child had died when a few days old or as a young
child, and the other whose baby had been still-born or where the woman had had a
miscarriage. Id. He rejected the distinction that would make the first couple a family,
but not the second couple. Id.
108. Id. at 509; [1975] 3 W.L.R. at 748.
109. Id. Lord Denning cited Cooke v. Head, [1972] 1 W.L.R. 518; [1972] 2 All E.R.
38 as an instance in which the court departed from a previous decision.
110. Id. at 509; [1975] 3 W.L.R. at 748.
111. Id.; [1975] 3 W.L.R. at 748.
112. Id.; [1975] 3 W.L.R. at 748. In Gammans, the Court of Appeal should not have
interfered with the lower court's decision unless it was reasonable in the sense that no
tribunal not acquainted with the ordinary use of language could reasonably reach that
decision. Id. Lord Denning cited Cozens v. Brutus, [1973] A.C. 854; [1973] 2 All E.R.
1297 to support this statement.
113. Dyson Holdings, [1976] Q.B. at 510; [1975] 3 W.L.R. at 748.
114. Id.; [1975] 3 W.L.R. at 748.
115. Lord James concurred in Lord Denning's opinion in Dyson Holdings. He did
not take the view that Gammans was decided incorrectly; Lord James believed that if
the word 'family' as it was used and understood in 1949 was applied to the facts in
Gammans, it would result in a finding that the defendant was not a member of the
tenant's family. Id. at 511-12; [1975] 3 W.L.R. at 750-51. He echoed Lord Denning's
opinion that the word must be given its popular meaning at the time relevant to the
decision in the particular case. Id. at 512; [1975] 3 W.L.R. at 751.
Lord Bridges, who gave the third decision in Dyson Holdings, felt some hesitation
on giving "effect to this changed social attitude and consequent change in the scope of a
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. [Vol. XVII:1
The legal reasoning in Dyson Holdings was criticized in
later cases although courts seem to treat the decision as binding.
In Helby v. Rafferty116 the court acknowledged that an unmar-
ried couple "living together over a very long period" could con-
stitute a family relationship for purposes of the Rent Act;1 7
however, the court distinguished Helby from Dyson Holdings by
determining that the unmarried couple did not have a sufficient
degree of permanence and stability to justify the view that they
were members of a single family."' The court pointed to the fact
that the woman had wanted to keep her freedom and her own
name thus deliberately avoiding permanence in the
relationship." 9
The House of Lords declined the opportunity to rule on the
approach to statutory interpretation used in Dyson Holdings
when they heard the appeal in Joram Developments Ltd. v.
Sharratt.120 The court felt that the difficult question posed by
Dyson Holdings - the extent to which changed social attitudes
towards cohabitation between unmarried couples and the off-
spring of such liaisons may have enlarged the meaning of the
common English word without doing violence to the doctrine of judicial precedent," but
concluded that it would be "unduly legalistic" to allow such a consideration to defeat the
appellants claim. Id. at 513; [1975] 3 W.L.R. at 751. He stated that:
[I]f language can change its meaning to accord with changing social attitudes,
then a decision on the meaning of a word in a statute before such a change
should not continue to bind thereafter, at all events in a case where the courts
have consistently affirmed that the word is to be understood in its ordinary
accepted meaning.
Id.; [1975] 3 W.L.R. at 751.
116. [1979] 1 W.L.R. 13; [1978] 3 All E.R. 1016 (C.A.).
117. Helby, [1979] 1 W.L.R. at 18; [1978] 3 All E.R. at 1020.
118. Helby, [1979] 1 W.L.R. at 18; [1978] 3 All E.R. at 1020.
119. Helby, [1979] 1 W.L.R. at 19; [1978] 3 All E.R. at 1020. The moral overtones of
this decision are shown in the language by the court regarding the woman's role in the
relationship. The court pointed to the fact that the female partner had not adopted the
character of a wife. Id. at 21; [1978] 3 All E.R. at 1021. The court goes on to list the
characteristics of a wife, which included the presence of children and the adoption of the
man's name as well as encouraging others to be regarded as members of the same family.
Id. at 21; [1978] 3 All E.R. at 1022-23. In this case the woman was a well known writer
who had made many appearances on television and the radio; she preferred an arrange-
ment that left her independent, but also gave her the security of marriage. Id. at 19;
[1978] 3 All E.R. at 1020. Not only was the woman's streak of independence noted by the
court, but it appears that the presence of some role reversal was disquieting; the man
had nursed his partner during her final illness. The court felt that the plaintiff's argu-
ment that the relationship was one of a "nursing dependence rather than one based on a
family unit" had weight. Id. at 20; [1978] 3 All E.R. at 1021.
120. [1979] 1 W.L.R. 1; [1975] 2 All E.R. 12 (C.A.); [1979] 1 W.L.R. 928; [1979] 2 All
E.R. 1084 (H.L.(E.)).
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expression "family" in the Rent Act - did not arise in this
case.121 The facts in Joram Developments were considered un-
usual, and therefore, did not provide a suitable occasion for the
court to undertake a general consideration of which people may
be included in the expression "a member of the original tenant's
family.' 22
The unique facts of Joram Developments involved a young
man who shared a flat and a platonic relationship with an eld-
erly widow who was the statutory tenant. 2 ' This relationship
lasted eighteen years: the young man looked after the widow in
her declining years. Upon her death, he stated that he had be-
come the statutory tenant by succession because he was a mem-
ber of the original tenant's family.
124
The county court judge held that this couple had achieved a
familial nexus such as one would only find in a family and dis-
missed the landlord's claim for possession. 25 The Court of Ap-
peal reversed the decision, finding that the appellant was inca-
pable of being a member of the tenant's family as a matter of
law.' 26 The House of Lords also found that the young man was
not a member of the widow's family.127 They acknowledged that
the definition of family was not limited to cases of a familial
nexus in the strict legal sense,'128 but that the definition still re-
quired a broadly recognizable de facto familial nexus recogniza-
ble as such by an ordinary man. 29 Two adults who had lived
together in a platonic relationship could never artificially estab-
lish such a relationship for the purposes of the statute. 30 There-
fore, while unmarried couples of the opposite sex were beginning
to be recognized as families by the courts, more unconventional
relationships were denied succession to rights.
121. [1979] 1 W.L.R. at 930; [1979] 2 All E.R. at 1086.
122. Id.; [1979] 2 All E.R. at 1086.
123. Id.; [1979] 2 All E.R. at 1086.
124. Id. at 928; [1979] 2 All E.R. at 1084.
125. Id.; [1979] 2 All E.R. at 1084.
126. Id. at 931; [1979] 2 All E.R. at 1087.
127. Id.; [1979] 2 All E.R. at 1087.
128. The strict legal sense appears to be a connection by way of consanguinity, of
affinity, of adoption (de jure or de facto) during minority, or of regular sexual intercourse
(past or present). Id. at 931; [1979] 2 All E.R. at 1087 (quoting Ross v. Collins, [1964] 1
W.L.R. 425, 432; [1964] 1 All E.R. 861, 866).
129. Id. at 931; [1979] 2 All E.R. at 1086 (quoting Brock v. Wollams, [1949] 2 K.B.
388, 395).
130. Id. at 931; [1979] 2 All E.R. at 1086 (quoting Ross v. Collins, [1964] 1 W.L.R.
425, 432; [1964] 1 All E.R. 861, 866).
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3. Recent Decisions: The Necessary Familial Nexus
In 1986 a woman who had been living with the deceased
tenant in a lesbian relationship challenged the definition of fam-
ily under the Housing Act.13 1 Harrogate Borough Council v.
Simpson'3 2 involved a woman who said that she was entitled to
a secure tenancy because she had lived with her partner as "hus-
band and wife."' 3 On appeal the woman argued that the Hous-
ing Act had intended to include relationships in which the
couple was living together as if married since the views of the
public had changed over the last decade concerning homosexual
relations.3 The court rejected this argument, however, stating
that although societal attitudes had changed in regard to infor-
mal living associations between men and women,3 5 if Parlia-
ment had meant the statute to be interpreted to recognize a ho-
mosexual couple, it would have plainly stated so.136 The court
concluded that to be husband and wife, the partners must be of
the opposite sex; it was not sufficient that the relationship had
all the characteristics of a spousal relationship except the ability
to bear children.3 7
The Housing Act only concerns public housing and defines
"member of family." In private housing tenancies, there is no
definition of member of family, but there have been no cases
involving homosexual cohabitees. Nonetheless, there have been
cases involving unmarried heterosexual couples.138 The court
could have chosen to apply the same tests of permanence and
131. Housing Act, 1980, ch. 51, §§ 30, 50, now Housing Act, 1985, ch. 68, §§ 87, 113.
Harrogate Borough Council v. Simpson, [1985] 2 F.L.R. 91; [1986] 16 Faro. 359.
132. [1986] 16 Fain. 359.
133. Id.
134. Id. It was argued that: (1) during the 1960s and 1970s Parliament recognized
that there was a form of relationship beside a formal marriage between two persons
which the public had come to recognize and accept as being a perfectly proper and nor-
mal relationship; (2) the manifestations of marriage could be had between unmarried
people: these manifestations were mutual love, monogamy, some degree of public ac-
knowledgment of their condition of living, faithfulness, a permanence of relationship,
sexual relations of some kind; and (3) the word "as" in the phrase "live together as
husband and wife" indicated that the provisions were intended to apply to people who
were not married but who gave the appearance of living together in the married state.
See Housing Act, 1980, ch. 51, § 50 (3).
135. Harrogate, [1986] 16 Fam. 359.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See Dyson Holdings, Ltd. v. Fox, [1976] Q.B. 503; [1975] 3 W.L.R. 744; [1975] 3
All E.R. 1030 (C.A.); Helby v. Rafferty, [1979] 1 W.L.R. 13; [1978] 3 All E.R. 1016 (C.A.);
Hawes v. Evendon, [1953] 1 W.L.R. 1169; [1953] 2 All E.R. 737.
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stability that are used for unmarried heterosexual couples to
these circumstances.
Two other recent Court of Appeal cases examined the defi-
nition of "member of the tenant's family" and produced two dif-
ferent results.' In Chios Property Investment Company Ltd. v.
Lopez, 4 ° the respondent was held to be a member of her de-
ceased cohabitee's family, although they had only been together
for two years.14' However, she had moved into his flat with the
intention of marrying him when their financial circumstances
improved. 42 Here, the county court stated that all the claimant
had to show was a sufficient state of permanence and stability
with the deceased tenant for it to be said that she was a member
of his family.143 It was argued that this was an error; the correct
test was whether an ordinary man would view the claimant as a
member of the tenant's family.141 Sir Waller found that the
county court had not been in error and had stated the correct
test. The Lopez court reasoned that when an ordinary man con-
siders whether someone is a member of another's family, the an-
swer must be based on the very test that the county court posed:
whether the relationship had reached a sufficient state of perma-
nence and stability for the claimant to be considered a member
of the deceased tenant's family. 45 The court took into consider-
ation the social mores of the 1980s: people often form a relation-
ship without a legal marriage. The Lopez court noted, however,
that this case was exceptional and should not be regarded as en-
titling courts to draw a similar inference from a similar short
139. Chios Property Inv. Co. Ltd. v. Lopez, [1987] 05 E.G.'7, 20 H.L.R. 120; [1988] 1
E.G.L.R. 98; Sefton Holdings Ltd. v. Cairns, [1988] 18 Fam. 164.
140. [1987] 05 E.G. 7, 20 H.L.R. 120; [1988] 1 E.G.L.R. 98.
141. Id.; 20 H.L.R. at 120; [1988] 1 E.G.L.R. at 98.
142. Id.; 20 H.L.R. at 120; [1988] 1 E.G.L.R. at 98.
143. Id.; 20 H.L.R. at 120; [1988] 1 E.G.L.R. at 98. Sir Waller said that there could
be no absolute rule about length of duration although the longer the relationship, the
easier it would be to infer permanence. Id. But there is no magic in the length of time
the couple has been together; it appears that the crucial question is whether the relation-
ship was quasi-marital. Id. Lopez is distinguished from Helby because in Helby, the
couple had a non-marital relationship, although they had been together for five years.
See Helby v. Rafferty, [1979] 1 W.L.R. 13; [1978] 3 All E.R. 1016 (C.A.).
144. Lopez, [1987] 05 E.G. 7, 20 H.L.R. 120; [1988] 1 E.G.L.R. 98 (quoting Dyson
Holdings, Ltd. v. Fox, [1976] Q.B. 503; [1975] 3 W.L.R. 744; [1975] 3 All E.R. 1030
(C.A.)). The landlord also tried to resurrect an old consideration by claiming that the
absence of children should have led the county court to conclude that this couple could
not be a family. Id. See also supra note 94 and accompanying text.
145. Lopez, [1987] 05 E.G. 7, 20 H.L.R. 124; [1988] 1 E.G.L.R. 98.
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period of time unless there were special circumstances. 146
In the second case, Sefton Holdings Ltd. v. Cairns,47 a wo-
man who moved in with a family after her own parents were
killed was found not to be a family member even though she had
been living with them for twenty-nine years. She claimed that
she was treated as if she were a daughter of the family. 48 At the
time that she moved in with the family she was not a minor and
there was no authority offering protection for a de facto adop-
tion of an adult. 49 In Sefton, the court ruled that the term fam-
ily had to be given its "ordinary, everyday meaning," which
meant a relationship of blood, marriage, or adoption. 50 The Sef-
ton court held that two "strangers" could not artificially estab-
lish a familial nexus'M  and dismissed the appeal even though it
described a close, familial relationship. 52 The court referred to
Dyson Holdings, and noted that a couple living together as hus-
band and wife would be regarded as having the requisite familial
nexus, but it did not explain why pretending to be a spouse is
less artificial than pretending to be a daughter or a sister. 53
Thus it seems to be possible to establish a familial nexus by liv-
ing together as man and wife but not as two sisters.
No attempt was made to define family by the Sefton court,
and the opinion was offered that no case existed in which a court
had found it possible to identify the necessary ingredient or
quality that distinguished a familial nexus from one that was
less than familial.15 Despite a few court decisions that looked at
146. Id.
147. [1988] 14 E.G. 58, 20 H.L.R. 124; [1988] 1 E.G.L.R. 99; [1988] 18 Faro. 164;
[1988] 2 F.L.R. 109.
148. Id. at 164.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. (citing Ross v. Collins, [1964] 1 W.L.R. 425, 432; [1964] 1 All E.R. 861, 866).
Ross involved a woman who had nursed a statutory tenant as well as her own mother
who had lived with the tenant for many years. She resided with the tenant for many
years after her mother's death and claimed that she had looked upon him as a sort of
elder relative: a brother or a father. It was held that she was not a member of the ten-
ant's family, however, because there was no family relationship of any kind. In his deci-
sion Lord Russell discussed the impossibility of two strangers artificially establishing a
familial nexus. Ross, [1964] 1 W.L.R. 425, 432; [1964] 1 All E.R. at 868.
152. Sefton Holdings, [1988] 14 E.G. 58, 20 H.L.R. 124; [1988] 1 E.G.L.R. 99; [1988]
18 Fam. 164; [1988] 2 F.L.R. 109.
153. Bainham, Sefton Holdings Ltd. v. Cairns (1987), 138 NEW L.J. 19 (Jan. 22,
1988).
154. Sefton Holdings, [1988] 14 E.G. 58, 20 H.L.R. 124; [1988] 1 E.G.L.R. 99; [1988]
18 Fam. 164; [1988] 2 F.L.R. 109.
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special circumstances, British courts recognize four types of rela-
tionships in determining succession rights to rent-regulated
housing. Children, spouses, one person acting in loco parentis to
another, and unmarried couples of the opposite sex who meet a
test of permanence and stability, are the current relationships
that meet the definition of family. The 1988 Act's impact is un-
clear. However, given its narrow language and strict residency
requirement, it appears that diverse-relationship families will
not be protected under its provisions.
IV. UNITED STATE STATUTORY AND CASE LAW
A. Statutory Law
1. The Growth of Rent Control
Historically, rent control regulations in the United States
have been imposed in times of war, or immediately thereafter, in
response to emergency housing shortages. 155 In 1970, however,
the federal government passed the Economic Stabilization Act 156
as a temporary measure to stabilize rents and to prevent oppres-
sive rent increases during a time of inflation. 157 The Economic
Stabilization Act also altered the prerequisite of an emergency
for rent control legislation to include economic need.15 Thus, in-
flation became the major force behind the passage of rent con-
155. The housing shortage after World War I caused the creation of rent controls in
the District of Columbia and some other states. See The Food Control and the District
of Columbia Rents Act, Pub. L. No. 66-63, §§ 101-122, 41 Stat. 297, 298 (1919) (extended
and amended 1922 and 1924; expired 1925); Act of April 1, 1920, chs. 136-39, 1920 N.Y.
Laws 228-32 (1920) (expired 1922). During World War II, Congress imposed rent con-
trols in various parts of the country in response to the wartime housing shortage. See
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-42, 56 Stat. 23 (1942) (expired
1947). Federal regulation continued under the Housing and Rent Act of 1947. See 61
Stat. 193, 62 Stat. 83, 63 Stat. 18, 64 Stat. 255, 65 Stat. 110 (1951). Congress authorized
federal rent controls in some areas until 1951; however, although these federal regula-
tions were totally eliminated in 1951, state and local governments frequently replaced
them with their own controls. See also Note, Rent Control and Landlord's Property
Rights: The Reasonable Return Doctrine Revived, 33 RUTGERS L. REv. 165, 168 (1980);
see also infra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
156. Pub. L. No. 91-379, §§ 201-06, 84 Stat. 799 (1970) (expired 1974).
157. See Pub. L. No. 91-379, § 202, 84 Stat. 799-800 (1970) (expired 1974). The
Economic Stabilization Act was part of the national wage and price controls imposed by
President Richard Nixon. Katz, Rent Lids Have Been Vexing Ever Since 1919, 68
A.B.A. J. 903 (1982).
158. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes and Con-
sequences, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 517, 527-28 (Mar. 1984) [hereinafter Rabin].
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trol laws.' 59
In anticipation of the expiration of the. Economic Stabiliza-
tion Act, several states passed their own rent control laws during
the late 1970s.160 This was the beginning of two decades of ex-
tensive legislation regulating residential tenancies and broaden-
ing the rights of tenants.' 6 ' These recent rent control laws
sharply limit rent increases. 162 The needs of the elderly, the
poor, and the handicapped were also taken into consideration. 168
Rent control regulations usually allow only for rent increases of
a specified percentage of the previously existing rent; prevent
evictions without good cause; and sometimes allow members of
the tenant's family to gain entitlement to the dwelling upon the
tenant's death or departure as a statutory tenant. 6 4 The Su-
preme Court has traditionally upheld the constitutionality of
rent control regulations.'
An estimated 200 communities currently have rent control
laws.166 The following states all have some form of rent control:
California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New
159. Rabin, supra note 158, at 520, 527-29 nn. 37, 44.
160. Rabin, supra note 158, at 527.
161. C. MOYNIHAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 76-78 (2d ed.
1988) [hereinafter C. MOYNIHAN]. Much of this legislation concerns warranties of habita-
bility in residential leases. See also Rabin, supra note 158, at 521-22.
162. See generally Rabin, supra note 158, at 521.
163. P. MARTIN, THE ILL-HousFD: CASES AND MATERIALS ON TENANT'S RIGHTS IN
PRIvATE AND PUBLIC HoUsING 1018, 1021 (1971) [hereinafter P. MARTIN]; see also infra
note 165.
164. A statutory tenancy is terminable at will by the tenant, but it is not terminable
at will by the landlord. It is only terminable by the landlord under limited circum-
stances. A tenant occupying premises subject to rent control gives him a more extensive
estate than under common law rules. C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 161, at 71.
165. The first challenge to the constitutionality of rent control regulations was in
1921 when the Supreme Court ruled in favor of a Washington tenant who stated that he
was entitled to stay in his apartment as long as he paid his rent. Block v. Hirsch, 256
U.S. 135 (1921). Rent control laws have consistently withstood attacks against their con-
stitutionality. See, e.g., Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944) (upholding power to
fix rents pursuant to Emergency Price Controls Act); Woods v. Cloyd W. Miner Co., 333
U.S. 138 (1948). These decisions, however, were usually based on the need for the local
governments to fix rent increases in times of emergency housing shortages. The need for
an emergency to sustain rent control regulations is no longer necessary. Rent control
laws were recently upheld in Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988). Chief Justice
Rehnquist found that states have a broad power to regulate housing conditions in gen-
eral and landlord-tenant relationships in particular, and that there were other legitimate
purposes of rent control besides the elimination of excessive rents caused by housing
shortages. The San Jose rent-control ordinance took into consideration such factors as
"hardship to a tenant" when determining rent increases; this was found to be a legiti-
mate purpose. Id. at 9-10.
166. Rabin, supra note 158, at 520, 527.
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York. l67 While many urban areas passed regulations during
times of housing crises, 16s and many areas enacted controls in
the late 1970s, l 19 New York State has stood alone in having a
comprehensive program of rent control for over four decades. 70
2. New York State's Rent Control Laws
Before the expiration of the federal rent control legislation
after World War II, New York State perceived a continuing
housing shortage and passed its own rent control plan, which
was fashioned after the federal law.1 71 The Emergency Housing
Rent Control Law of 1946172 resulted in the promulgation of suc-
ceeding housing rent regulations. These controls ended in 1962,
but at that time New York City enacted its own rent control law
(Rent Control) .17 3 The city placed more than one million apart-
ments under city rent control. Concern for the plight of low-in-
167. In California, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Berkeley, Santa Monica, and about
20 other cities have rent control laws. The state allows municipalities great leeway in
establishing such controls. The city of Hartford and approximately 10 other cities in
Connecticut have a "mild form [of rent control] that comes into play only if tenants
complain about rents." Boston, Brookline, and Cambridge, Massachusetts all went to the
legislature and asked that regulations be enacted. Frank, Learn the Rules: Rent Control
May Spread, 71 A.B.A. J. 22 (1985). Rent-control laws are especially popular in New
Jersey where almost 200 communities are estimated to have some form of rent control,
and the state allows the local governing body to institute such controls themselves. Katz,
Presidential Panel Calls for Ban on Rent Control, 68 A.B.A. J. 903 (1982). The states of
Washington, Colorado, and Arizona ban rent control. Id. In New York State, New York
City and the counties of Westchester, Rockland, and Nassau all have rent-control regula-
tions. Indeed, New York State has had rent control for over four decades. See infra notes
171-72 and accompanying text.
168. P. MARTIN, supra note 163, at 1018.
169. See generally Rabin, supra note 158, at 527.
170. P. MARTIN, supra note 163, at 1018.
171. New York State rent-control laws cover apartments built before 1947 that have
been occupied by the same tenant since at least 1971. These rent guidelines affect about
167,000 apartments, most of them in New York City. They limit the rent increases land-
lords can charge in apartments with long-term tenants. Since state law says that family
members can continue to live in a rent-controlled apartment after a tenant dies, the
meaning of the word family becomes crucial because it may represent a savings of hun-
dreds of dollars a month. N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1989, at B2, cols. 1-2; L.A. Times, July 7,
1989, at 24, col. 6.
172. N.Y. [Emergency Housing Rent Control Law] §§ 8581-97 (McKinney 1974) (L.
1946, ch. 274 as amended by L. 1947, ch. 704; L. 1948, ch. 678; L. 1949, ch. 591). This law
has been frequently amended and is still in force outside of New York City.
173. P. MARTIN, supra note 163, at 1019-20. N.Y. [New York City Rent and Reha-
bilitation Law] §§ Y51-1.0-18.0 (McKinney 1974) (1962 Local Law No. 20 as recodified
by L. 1985, ch. 907, § 1), (current version at [New York City Rent Control] §§ 26-401-26-
415 (McKinney 1987)).
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come tenants can be discerned in these laws.17 4 New construc-
tion and high-rent housing were exempted from the
regulations. 175 Under Rent Control laws, neither the surviving
spouse of the deceased tenant, nor some other member of the
deceased tenant's family who was living with the tenant at the
time of death, can be evicted.176 The precise language regarding
family members is "some other member of the deceased tenant's
family. 1 77 Family is defined as a "household including not only
the servants but also the head of the household and all persons
in it related . . . by blood or marriage."17 8
It was assumed in 1962 that further rent controls would not
be needed, and indeed, decontrol of regulations did occur.17 9 By
1968, however, New York City faced another housing shortage
and responded to this new crisis by enacting the Rent Stabiliza-
tion Act of 1968 (Rent Stabilization Act). 1 0 The buildings ef-
fected included those not already under rent control, and more
and higher rent increases were tolerated under these new regula-
tions than under the previous Rent Control law.1 8' It was clearly
contemplated by the legislature that rent control would eventu-
ally end as rent-controlled tenancies terminated and became
subject to rent stabilization. 18 2 Since the Rent Stabilization Act
required landlords to grant a one or two year lease to the tenant
but failed to define tenant anywhere in the statute,8 3 succession
to the tenancy once the original tenant died or vacated the
174. P. MARTIN, supra note 163, at 1020.
175. N.Y. [New York City Rent and Rehabilitation Law] § YY51-3.0(e)(2) (McKin-
ney 1974), (current version at [New York City Rent Stabilization] § 26-504 (McKinney
1987)).
176. N.Y. [New York City Rent and Eviction Regulations] § 56(d) (McKinney
1974), (current version at [Rent and Eviction Regulations - New York City] § 2204.6(d)
(McKinney 1987)).
177. Id.
178. Bistany v. Williams, 83 Misc.2d 228, 229, 372 N.Y.S.2d 6, 7 (N.Y. City Ct. 1975)
(citing Webster's Third New Int'l Unabridged Dictionary 821 (1961)).
179. P. MARTIN, supra note 163, at 1018-19.
180. N.Y. [New York City Rent Stabilization Law] §§ YY51-1.0-8.0 (McKinney
1983) (1969 Local Law No. 16 as amended by Local Law 1974, No. 1 and recodified as L.
1985, ch. 907, § 1), (current version at §§ 26-501-26-520 (McKinney 1987)).
181. N.Y. [New York City Rent Stabilization Law] § YY51-5.0(b)(3) (McKinney
1983), (current version at § 26-510(b)(3) (Mckinney 1987)).
182. See N.Y. [New York City Rent and Rehabilitation Law] §§ Y51-1.0-18.0 (Mc-
Kinney 1974), (current version at [New York City Rent Control] §§ 26-401-26-415 (Mc-
kinney 1987)).
183. N.Y. [New York City Rent Stabilization Law] § YY51-6.0(c)(4) (McKinney
1983), (current version at § 26-511(c)(4) (Mckinney 1987)).
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apartment remained questionable.
Six weeks after a potentially devastating Court of Appeals
decision, which apparently would allow for the eviction of mem-
bers of a tenant's family if their names were not on the lease,'184
the Emergency Operational Bulletin (Bulletin) was enacted on
December 11, 1985.185 Its purpose was to authorize new protec-
tions against evictions for tenants of rent-stabilized apart-
ments.186 Certain members of the tenant's family defined as "im-
mediate family members" received preferential protection.
Family members who had previously received protection, like
siblings, grandparents, grandchildren, and in-laws were not con-
sidered immediate family members.'87 Therefore, the Bulletin
clearly limited its protection to members of a traditional nuclear
family rather than an extended family. The rights of succession
were also severely limited by the Bulletin's stringent residency
requirement. Special provisions were made, however, for the eld-
erly and the disabled. 88 Nevertheless, in 1987, an appellate
court found these emergency provisions to be unauthorized. 189
184. Sullivan v. Brevard Associates, 66 N.Y.2d 489, 488 N.E.2d 1208, 498 N.Y.S.2d
96 (1985). See infra notes 221-24 and accompanying text.
185. Division of Housing and Community Renewal, Emergency Operational Bulletin
85-1 (Emergency Operational Bulletin), December 10, 1985.
186. In rent-stabilized housing situations, the "owner must offer a renewal lease to
an immediate family member... if that member has continuously resided in the apart-
ment and maintained it as a primary residence since either (1) the tenancy began, or, (2)
since the beginning of the relationship as a member of the immediate family." Note,
Succession Rights, supra note 4, at 228-29. Immediate family member is defined as a
husband, wife, son, daughter, stepson, stepdaughter, father, or mother. Id. at 229.
A landlord must offer a right of first refusal to a new lease to non-immediate family
members such as a brother, sister, nephew, niece, uncle, aunt, grandchild, grandparent,
stepparent, father-in-law, mother-in-law, son-in-law, and daughter-in-law if that person
has lived continuously in the apartment and maintained it as a primary residence since
the tenancy began or since the beginning of the relationship as a member of the tenant's
non-immediate family. Id. (citing the provisions of the Emergency Operational Bulletin).
For a complete discussion of the provisions of the Emergency Operational Bulletin and
its impact, see Note, Succession Rights, supra note 4, at 227-30.
187. Note, Succession Rights, supra note 4, at 223 n.50.
188. The Emergency Operational Bulletin provides for instances when a family
member moves into the apartment of an elderly or disabled relative, or when an elderly
or disabled relative moves in with a family member. The landlord must offer a renewal
lease to the remaining relative, or conversely to the remaining elderly or disabled rela-
tive. It should be noted, however, that the special provisions only apply if the two rela-
tives are immediate family members. See Note, Succession Rights, supra note 4, at 229.
189. Two Associates v. Brown, 131 Misc.2d 986, 502 N.Y.S.2d 604 (Sup. Ct. 1986),
rev'd on other grounds, 127 A.D.2d 173, 513 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1st Dep't 1987) (trial court
found that homosexual partner of a deceased tenant was a family member for purposes
of a renewal lease; appellate court found that Emergency Operational Bulletin was
unauthorized).
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Two proposed rent stabilization codes were drafted after the
Bulletin which substantially changed the rent-stabilization
law. 90 The second revised code was implemented; the differenti-
ation between immediate and nonimmediate family members
was eliminated and combined into a category of family mem-
bers.' If the tenant vacates, a family member'9 2 has the right to
a renewal lease if the apartment is the primary residence since
the beginning of the tenancy or the beginning of the relation-
ship. 93 If the tenant dies, family members have the right to a
renewal lease if the family member has lived there for at least
two years prior to the death of the tenant.19 These regulations
use blood relationships as well as marital relationships as the
primary criteria for succession to rent-regulated apartments. In
the wake of a recent New York Court of Appeals decision, which
found a homosexual couple to fall under the definition of family
within the Rent Control laws, 95 New York State housing offi-
cials expanded the definition of family on November 8, 1989 to
include nontraditional family members for the more than one
million rent-stabilized apartments statewide. The new proposed
regulations specify that people unrelated to a tenant by blood or
marriage can remain in a rent-stabilized apartment if they meet
two primary requirements: one, living with the tenant for at
least two years (one year for the elderly and the disabled); and
two, showing emotional and financial commitment and interde-
pendence between themselves and the person on the lease. 9" On
190. See Note, Succession Rights, supra note 4, at 222 n.47.
191. N.Y. [Rent Stabilization Code] §§ 2523.5(b)(1) & (b)(2) (McKinney 1987).
192. Family member is defined as: husband, wife, son, daughter, stepson, stepdaugh-
ter, father, mother, stepfather, stepmother, brother, sister, nephew, niece, uncle, aunt,
grandfather, grandmother, grandson, granddaughter, father-in-law, mother-in-law, son-
in-law, and daughter-in-law. N.Y. [Rent Stabilization Code] § 2520.6(o) (McKinney
1987).
193. N.Y. [Rent Stabilization Code] § 2523.5(b)(1) (McKinney 1987).
194. N.Y. [Rent Stabilization Code § 2523.5(b)(2) (McKinney 1987).
195. Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co., 74 N.Y.2d 201, 543 N.E.2d 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d
784 (1989). See infra notes 227-41 and accompanying text.
196. The Division of Housing and Community Renewal has proposed to amend sec-
tion 2520.6 by adding the following provisions:
(n) Immediate Family. A husband, wife, son, daughter, stepson, step-
daughter, father, mother, stepfather, stepmother, brother, sister, grandfather,
grandmother, grandson or granddaughter of the owner [or the tenant].
(o) Family Member.
(1) A husband, wife, son, daughter, stepson, stepdaughter, father, mother,
stepfather, stepmother, brother, sister, nephew, niece, uncle, aunt, grandfather,
grandmother, grandson, granddaughter, father-in-law, mother-in-law, son-in-
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November 9, 1989, however, New York City landlords brought a
suit against the State Agency and were able to obtain a tempo-
rary restraining order against the new rules.197
law, or daughter-in-law of the tenant or permanent tenant; or
(2) Any other person residing with the tenant or permanent tenant in the
housing accommodation as a primary or principal residence, respectively, who
can prove emotional and financial commitment, and interdependence between
such person and the tenant or permanent tenant. Although no single factor
shall be solely determinative, evidence which is to be considered in determin-
ing whether such emotional and financial commitment and interdependence
existed, may include, without limitation, such factors as listed below. In no
event would evidence of a sexual relationship between such persons be re-
quired or considered.
(i) longevity of the relationship;
(ii) sharing of or relying upon each other for payment of household
or family expenses, and/or other common necessities of life;
(iii) intermingling of finances as evidenced by, among other things,
joint ownership of bank accounts, personal and real property, credit
cards, loan obligations, sharing a household budget for purposes of re-
ceiving government benefits, etc.;
(iv) engaging in family-type activities by jointly attending family
functions, holidays and celebrations, social and recreational activities,
etc.;
(v) formalizing of legal obligations, intentions, and responsibilities
to each other by such means as executing wills naming each other as
executor and/or beneficiary, granting each other a power of attorney
and/or conferring upon each other authority to make health care deci-
sions each for the other, entering into a personal relationship contract,
making a domestic partnership declaration, or serving as a representa-
tive payee for purposes of public benefits, etc.;
(vi) holding themselves out as family members to other family
members, friends, members of the community or religious institutions,
or society in general, through their words or actions;
(vii) regularly performing family functions, such as caring for each
other or each other's extended family members, and/or relying upon
each other for daily family services;
(viii) engaging in any other pattern of behavior, agreement, or other
action which evidences the intention of creating a long-term, emotion-
ally-committed relationship.
Division of Housing and Community Renewal, Emergency Proposed Permanent Amend-
ments to the New York State Rent Regulations On Succession Rights of Family Mem-
bers Residing with Rent Stabilized and Rent Controlled Tenants, November 8, 1989.
See also N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1989, at B2, col. 1. These emergency regulations took
effect immediately to block landlords from evicting unrelated people. "We must assure
that nontraditional family members of tenants, especially those most vulnerable such as
the elderly, disabled and persons infected with the AIDS virus, are not unfairly subject
to eviction," stated Richard L. Higgins, the Commissioner of the New York State Divi-
sion of Housing and Community Renewal. Id. at B1, cols. 2-3. This change in regulations,
following so soon after the Braschi decision means that New York state is looking at the
reality of family life in making its decision. Id. at B2, col. 1.
197. Rent Stabilization Ass'n v. Higgins, No. - (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 1st Dep't, filed
Nov. 9, 1989). At this time, the case is still pending. Even if the new regulations are
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B. Case Law
1. Members of the Family
The earliest cases in New York State regarding succession
rights to tenancies were brought under the Emergency Housing
Rent Control Law. 198 These cases typically involved a landlord's
desire to regain possession of an apartment and decontrol it af-
ter the tenant had died or departed.199 The cases also began to
define exactly who are members of the tenant's family.
In Matter of Waitzman v. McGoldrick,"0 e the court held
that since the original tenant's in-laws were members of the
family unit at the time the landlord purchased the apartment,
they were entitled to protection from eviction. 20 1 The court
stated that these family members were protected despite the de-
parture of the original tenant.202 Other cases found that an aunt
and a nephew living with the tenant were members of the fam-
ily,2 0 3 and even that a maid who "slept in sporadically" was part
of a family unit.04
These early cases established that blood relatives and peo-
ple related by marriage to the tenant were members of the ten-
ant's family, but required the family member to be able to offer
enacted, there is still a stringent residency requirement, and a test to pass for those who
wish to inherit an apartment. A lengthy residency requirement may serve as a barrier to
succeeding to rent-regulated housing, especially when the tenant is ill. See West 22nd
Street Ass'n v. Thomas, 144 Misc.2d 292, 547 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1st Dep't 1989).
New York State Governor Mario Cuomo has announced that he will seek legislation
to allow homosexuals to inherit their partners' rent-controlled apartments. U.P. Int'l,
Jan. 3, 1990 (NEXIS).
198. N.Y. [Emergency Housing Rent Control Law] §§ 8581-97 (McKinney 1974);
N.Y. [State Rent and Evictions Regulations] §§ 1-117 (McKinney 1974), (current version
at [Rent and Evictions Regulations] §§ 2100-2109 (McKinney 1987)).
199. After the rent controlled tenancy ends, the landlord is allowed to return the
apartment to the open market and charge a free market rate for it. See Note, Succession
Rights, supra note 4, at 217.
200. 20 Misc.2d 1085, 121 N.Y.S.2d 515 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
201. Id.; 121 N.Y.S.2d at 515. Here, the members of the family unit were the ten-
ant's mother-in-law and sister-in-law. See also Bierer v. Abrams, 20 Misc.2d 1085, 201
N.Y.S.2d 110 (1956) (mother and father of tenant entitled to possession of apartment
after tenant had left).
202. Waitzman, 20 Misc.2d at 1086, 121 N.Y.S.2d at 516 (citing Goodman v. Ross,
274 A.D. 811, 79 N.Y.S.2d 791 (2d Dep't 1948)). In Goodman, other occupants (case
doesn't specify the relationship to tenant) were found to be entitled to "possession, use
and occupancy" of apartment despite the fact that original tenant had moved. Id.; 121
N.Y.S.2d at 516.
203. Osborne v. Weaver, 7 A.D.2d 653, 180 N.Y.S.2d 149, 150 (2d Dep't 1958).
204. Lion Brewery of New York City v. Weaver, 8 A.D.2d 173, 175, 186 N.Y.S.2d
912, 914 (1st Dep't 1959).
1991] FAMILY TIES
proof of the relationship.2 05 Surviving spouses were found to
have succession rights, but not if they were not living with the
tenant at the time of death and had established an independent
residence elsewhere. 206
The court in Cesbron v. Reardon0 7 believed that the mem-
ber of the family had to be in "lineal descent," and found that
"aunts, along with the whole avuncular class of nieces and neph-
ews" were outside the definition of immediate family. 208 In a
later case, Bistany v. Williams,21e however, the court ruled that
Cesbron was in error, and that the rent regulations spoke only of
"'some other members of the deceased tenant's family,' not 'im-
mediate family.' ,,210 The Bistany court found that a nephew
who continuously resided with his uncle since the age of six
months was a statutory tenant.21'
Indeed, the New York courts appeared to be taking a practi-
cal approach to cases involving succession rights. In Herzog v.
Joy212 a sister who moved into her older sister's apartment and
who remained in residence after her sister, the original tenant,
moved out could not be evicted. The court found that the test of
tenancy under the rent control laws was not whether the apart-
ment was occupied by the tenant of record, but rather, whether
it is occupied by the person entitled to possession.21 3 In Herzog
the original tenant had moved out, but because the remaining
sister had been residing in the apartment before her departure,
205. Jantzen v. Weaver, 10 A.D.2d 75, 77, 197 N.Y.S.2d 685, 688 (1st Dep't 1960) (a
woman who claimed to be the departed tenant's niece was unable to offer any proof of
the relationship, and gave conflicting statements regarding paying rent, was found not to
be a family member).
206. Boman Realty Corp. v. Trice, 205 Misc. 588, 131 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1954) (husband
who was not living with his wife and who had established another residence was found
not to be a statutory tenant in wife's residence).
207. 73 Misc.2d 715, 343 N.Y.S.2d 163 (1973).
208. Cesbron, 73 Misc.2d at 716, 343 N.Y.S.2d at 164-65 (citing Samuel Rubin &
Son, Inc., v. Sackler, 190 Misc. 1064, 76 N.Y.S.2d 286, 287) (an immediate member of the
deceased tenant's family did not become a squatter, but was entitled to possession of
apartment). Cesbron relied on the language of Sackler which protected an immediate
family member of the tenant's family, barring the "protective mantle" of the rent control
law only to those of lineal descent. Id. at 716, 343 N.Y.S.2d at 164-65. In Cesbron, a
nephew of the tenant was not allowed to become a statutory tenant despite living with
his aunt for three years. Id.
209. 83 Misc.2d 228, 372 N.Y.S.2d 6 (N.Y. City Ct. 1975).
210. Id. at 228-29, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 6-7.
211. Id. at 229, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 7.
212. 74 A.D.2d 372, 428 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1st Dep't 1980), afl'd, 53 N.Y.2d 821, 422
N.E.2d 582, 439 N.Y.S.2d 922 (1981).
213. Id. at 375, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 4.
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and because she was a close family member, the court found her
to be entitled to occupancy.214 The court noted that more dis-
tant relatives than siblings had been found to be members of the
tenant's family.2 15
The lack of definition of members of the family allowed
courts to interpret the statute fairly loosely. Within that defini-
tion, however, courts appeared to be recognizing blood or mari-
tal relationships that had some degree of stability and perma-
nence. Yet, after the passage of the rent stabilization laws, a
shift occurred.
2. Member of the Immediate Family
One of the first succession cases under the Rent Stabiliza-
tion Act requested a definition of the term "members of the im-
mediate family of tenant." In Tagert v. 211 East 70th Street
Co.,2"' a tenant wanted permission for his son and his son's fam-
ily to move into his apartment for the remainder of his lease. He
asked that his son be granted a renewal lease on either the
grounds that he was a subtenant or a "member of the immediate
family of tenant. '217 The New York Court of Appeals held that
while the lease provided for concurrent occupancy by the tenant
and his family members, this case did not fall under the provi-
sion. Since the tenant had not occupied the apartment at the
same time as his son, the court found that the son had no right
to the apartment.21 The court did note, however, that family
members who actually lived with a tenant would be able to con-
tinue to occupy the apartment for the remainder of the lease
upon the tenant's death or departure.2 19 The court added that
family members could not succeed to a tenancy by moving into
an apartment upon the tenant's death or departure, and most
significantly, that a landlord is not required to renew a lease
when an apartment is successively passed to members of the
214. Id. at 374-76, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 3-4.
215. Id. at 376, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 3. See supra notes 201-03 and accompanying text.
216. 63 N.Y.2d 818, 472 N.E.2d 22, 482 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1984).
217. Id. at 820, 472 N.E.2d at 23, 482 N.Y.S. at 247. Initially, the Rent Stabilization
Act did not define its terms, therefore an "'informal rule of thumb' for rent stabilized
apartments [arose]: if an immediate family member lived with the tenant of record for at
least six months ...the relative was entitled to a renewal lease." Note, Succession
Rights, supra note 4, at 223 n.50.
218. Id. at 821-22, 472 N.E.2d at 23-24, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 248.
219. Id. at 821, 472 N.E.2d at 23-24, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 248.
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tenant's family.220
In 1985 Sullivan v. Brevard Associates2 1 directly chal-
lenged the issue of whether a landlord had to offer a renewal
lease to a relative who had lived with the tenant and who had
remained in the apartment after the departure of the original
tenant. In Sullivan a sister asked for validation of her tenancy
after the original tenant had established tenancy elsewhere.222
Since the lease had expired by the time the case reached the
Court of Appeals, however, the remaining issue was whether the
landlord must offer a renewal lease. The court held that under
the Rent Stabilization Act, a landlord must offer a renewal lease
only to a tenant of record and does not have to offer a renewal
lease to a relative of a tenant who occupies the apartment with
the tenant.223 The court determined that the rent stabilization
legislation deliberately omitted a definition of tenant because
the law only meant the person named on the lease to be consid-
ered the tenant. The court did not discuss whether a sister could
be defined as an immediate family member and entitled to
224succession.
This decision was shocking because of its potentially devas-
tating results. Widows and children of deceased tenants, as well
as unmarried couples or homosexual couples who had lived to-
gether over a long period of time, discovered that they had no
succession rights to their apartment. It was shortly after this de-
cision that the Bulletin and other legislation was passed in order
to overcome this decision and to provide for succession by vari-
ous family members of the tenant.225 The current regulations use
blood or marital relationships as criteria for succession, but give
little protection to unmarried homosexual or heterosexual
couples as well as to more unusual family configurations.226
3. Recent Trends: The Reality of Family Life
The most recent decision by the New York Court of Ap-
peals concerning succession rights to rent-controlled apartments
220. Id., 472 N.E.2d at 23-24, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 248.
221. 66 N.Y.2d 489, 488 N.E.2d 1208, 498 N.Y.S.2d 96 (N.Y. 1985).
222. Id. at 491, 488 N.E.2d at 1208-09, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 97.
223. Id. at 490-91, 488 N.E.2d at 1208, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 96.
224. Id. at 492, 488 N.E.2d at 1209, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 97.
225. See supra notes 184-86, 191 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 191-93 and accompanying text.
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is Braschi v. Stahl Associates Company.22 7 This decision called
for a more realistic view of the family, one that does not "rest on
fictitious legal distinctions or genetic history, but instead [finds]
its foundations in the reality of family life." 228 Braschi held that
a homosexual couple who had lived together for a decade could
be considered a family under New York City's rent control regu-
lations.22 9 The court never mentioned sexual orientation or mari-
tal status in its language, choosing to focus instead on the qual-
ity of the relationship between the couple in reaching its
decision. 30 It held that unmarried lifetime partners of tenants
should be included in the term family as used in the rent control
laws.23
1
In Braschi one of the partners of a homosexual couple
whose mate had died sought protection from eviction from their
rent-controlled apartment. He claimed succession rights as a
member of the deceased tenant's family who had been living
with the tenant.2 32 The Court of Appeals stated that the resolu-
tion of this problem required a determination of the meaning of
the word family.2 33 Previously, the New York Supreme Court
had examined the nature of Braschi's relationship with his de-
ceased partner and found that a ten-year interdependent rela-
227. 74 N.Y.2d 201, 543 N.E.2d 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1989).
228. Id. at 211, 543 N.E.2d at 53, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 788.
229. Id. at 201, 543 N.E.2d at 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 784.
230. See generally Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 201, 543 N.E.2d at 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 784.
Nonetheless, this decision is "the first time any top state court in the nation has recog-
nized a gay couple to be the legal equivalent of a family." L.A. Times, July 7, 1989, at 24,
col. 6.
It is predicted that the next decade will bring a change in the legal rights of homo-
sexual couples. Paula L. Ettelbrick, Legal Director of Lambda Legal Defense and Educa-
tion Fund, Remarks at Brooklyn Law School Forum on Domestic Partnership Legisla-
tion and the Changing Definition of Family (Nov. 30, 1989). Denmark has already
allowed homosexual couples to be legally joined together in "registered partnerships."
These partnerships give these couples most of the same rights that married, heterosexual
couples enjoy, with the major exception of not having the right to adopt a child. N.Y.
Times, Oct. 2, 1989, at A8, col. 4. It seems that allowing homosexuals to marry will even-
tually happen. However, Paula Ettelbrick argues that this goal is flawed. By legalizing
homosexual marriages, she believes that the law is forcing homosexuals to accept tradi-
tional heterosexual institutions. Ettelbrick thinks the correct aim should be a tolerance
for divergent life-styles. Isaacson, supra note 8, at 102, col. 3.
231. Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 201, 543 N.E.2d at 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 784. Before Bras-
chi, lower courts implied that the rent control provisions protected unmarried homosex-
ual and heterosexual couples. See Gelman v. Castaneda, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 22, 1986, at 13,
col. 1 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.); Zimmerman v. Burton, 107 Misc.2d 401, 434 N.Y.S.2d 127 (N.Y.
Civ. Ct. 1980).
232. Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 206-07, 543 N.E.2d at 50-51, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 785-86.
233. Id. at 206, 543 N.E.2d at 50, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 785.
[Vol. XVII'I
1991] FAMILY TIES
tionship met "any definitional criteria of the term 'family'. 234
The New York Supreme Court's assessment of the relationship
included: the exclusivity and longevity of the relationship; the
level of emotional and financial commitment; the manner in
which the couple handled their everyday life; the way they held
themselves out to society; and the reliance that they had on each
other.2 35 The appellate division reversed this decision, stating
that the rent control law only protects family members within
traditional, legally recognized familial relationships. 38 A homo-
sexual couple is not given protection by the law, so the court
held that Braschi could not be protected by the rent control
law's noneviction provision.2 3 7
Although Braschi lists the characteristics a relationship
must possess to qualify for legal consideration as a family, it
cautions that the "totality of the relationship" would control.138
It is a narrow ruling,23 9 singularly concerned with New York
City's rent control regulations, but Braschi is likely to be prece-
dent setting because the language of the decision extends be-
yond the rights of a homosexual couple to encompass other di-
verse-relationship families.240 Indeed, one case that followed on
234. Id., 543 N.E.2d at 51, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 786.
235. Id. at 212-13, 543 N.E.2d at 55, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 790.
236. Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co., 143 A.D.2d 44, 45, 531 N.Y.S.2d 532 (lst Dep't
1988).
237. Id.
238. Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 213, 543 N.E.2d at 55, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 790.
239. Indeed, just how narrow the Braschi decision is was shown in Matter of Alison
D. v. Virginia M., 155 A.D.2d 11, 552 N.Y.S.2d 331 (2d Dep't 1990). Here, a woman who
had shared responsibility for child-rearing with her former lesbian partner had no legal
visitation rights. In the dissent Justice Kooper argued that just as Braschi necessitated a
re-examination of the definition of family, these circumstances compelled a re-examina-
tion of parent. Id.
240. N.Y. Times, July 7, 1989, at Al, col. 1. "As the definition of family is litigated
across the country ... courts are going to be looking for precedents and this case is
going to be the landmark." Id. Braschi is being claimed by the gay community as a
"ground-breaking victory for lesbians and gay men." N.Y. Times, July 7, 1989, at Al, col.
1. See also Newsday, July 7, 1989, at 26, col. 2.
Since the Braschi decision, New York courts have extended protection to diverse-
relationship families living in rent-stabilized apartments. See East 10th St. v. Estate of
Goldstein, 154 A.D.2d 142, 552 N.Y.S.2d 257 (lst Dep't 1990); Park Holding Co. v.
Power, 554 N.Y.S.2d 861 (1st Dep't 1990). Protections were considered even more essen-
tial in rent-stabilized housing because the less restrictive provisions of the rent stabiliza-
tion laws make it easier to evict tenants.
One court has even broadened the Braschi test; a homosexual couple that had main-
tained an exclusive relationship, but had not held themselves out to their respective fam-
ilies as a couple, were found to be a family. The court ruled that it would be "unfair and
inappropriate" for a homosexual couple to "hold themselves out openly and notoriously
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Braschi's heels cited Braschi in its determination that a mother
and son who had lived as a family with the tenant of a rent con-
trolled apartment, were found to be members of his family even
though there had been neither marriage nor adoption2 41 It ap-
pears crucial, however, that the pending regulations242 be en-
acted if diverse relationship families are to be protected.
V. COMPARISON OF THE CURRENT LEGAL DEFINITIONS
The United States and Great Britain have always had dis-
parate approaches to rent control. At this time, however, the
United States and Great Britain appear to be in the process of
reversing their respective stances towards rent-regulated hous-
ing. Indeed, they are actually adopting each other's position.
Great Britain, which has a long legislative tradition of giving
abundant rights to tenants, has recently enacted legislation that
will eventually result in the elimination of rent control.4 3 The
succession rights to rent-regulated housing have been narrowed
and restricted in line with this legislative change. Under this leg-
islation, Great Britain will only allow a spouse, or the equivalent
of a spouse, to inherit a statutory tenancy.244
The United States has had a history of leaving tenants'
rights under the control of the states. With the notable excep-
tion of the jurisdiction of the state of New York, the remaining
states have neglected landlord-tenant law.24 In the last two de-
cades, however, there has been a dramatic change in landlord-
tenant legislation throughout the United States, which has given
enormous rights to tenants.2 46 Riding on this crest of change, the
New York State courts have broadened the definition of family
in succession rights to include a relationship that does not have
the previously needed criteria of blood ties or marital ties.247
New York State is also trying to enact legislation that would
clearly give a person who is unrelated to a tenant by blood or
to their own families [because] some segments of our society ... look askance at gay
and lesbian relationships." Lerad Realty Co. v. Reynolds, N.Y.L.J. (Aug. 29, 1990) at 22,
cols. 5-6 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.).
241. 2-4 Realty Associates v. Pittman, 137 Misc.2d 898, 523 N.Y.S.2d 7, afl'd, 547
N.Y.S.2d 515 (1st Dep't 1989) (the Civil Court's decision was cited in Braschi).
242. See supra notes 195-97 and accompanying text.
243. See Housing Act, 1988, ch. 50.
244. See Housing Act, 1988, ch. 50, sched. 4.
245. P. MARTIN, supra note 163, at 1018.
246. Rabin, supra note 158, at 527.
247. See Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d 201, 543 N.E.2d 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1989).
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marriage succession rights to rent-regulated housing. 248
These changes in both countries are so recent that it is un-
clear what direction the law will eventually take. Great Britain
has just enacted legislation that takes a dramatic step towards
decontrol, but it should be remembered that the Rent Acts fluc-
tuated in the past, bringing decontrolled housing back under
rent control in times of economic hardship. 49 This new legisla-
tion clearly favors landlords, and it can be predicted that it will
have a negative impact on tenants. The legislation does not seem
to be aware of the fact that a majority of families are no longer
nuclear;250 there is no room for the recognition of diverse-rela-
tionship families within its provisions for succession to rent-reg-
ulated apartments.251 Therefore, it appears that tenants who
choose to live in unusual family configurations will be barred
from inheriting their homes.
Before the 1988 Act was passed in Great Britain, the courts
recognized four types of relationships as constituting a family.
Historically, the categories of children, marital relationships,
and someone acting in loco parentis to another were recognized
as family members. A fourth category of unmarried cohabitees
of the opposite sex was added when the British courts realized
that this form of relationship was socially acceptable. This last
category was subjected to tests of stability and permanence, as
well as an appearance of marriage,252 in order to qualify as a
family under succession rights.
It seems likely that unmarried couples will be subjected to a
similar standard of permanence and appearance of marriage by
the language of the 1988 Act, which states that succession win
only be to a spouse or a person living as the tenant's spouse.253
This language leaves possibilities for differing treatment for un-
married couples under the 1988 Act as it" was applied in cases
like Helby254 and Lopez.255 In Helby, although there had been a
long-term mutually interdependent relationship, the court found
this couple to fall outside of the definition of family because
248. See supra note 196.
249. See supra notes 51-53.
250. See supra note 8.
251. See Housing Act, 1988, ch. 50, sched. 4.
252. See Helby v. Rafferty, [1979] 1 W.L.R. 13; [1978] 3 All E.R. 1016 (C.A.).
253. See Housing Act, 1988, ch. 50, sched. 4, para. 2.
254. See Helby, [1979] 1 W.L.R. 13; [1978] 3 All E.R. 1016.
255. See Lopez, [1987] 05 E.G. 57, 20 H.L.R. 120; [1988] 1 E.G.L.R. 98.
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they had no plans to marry and did not hold themselves out to
society as married. In Lopez the relationship was of a much
shorter duration, but the court found that this couple was 'a
family because they had had plans to marry. This preference can
also be discerned in the language of the 1988 Act.
Homosexual couples are not recognized as families by the
British courts.256 It appears that homosexual couples will con-
tinue to be denied succession rights under the 1988 Act. Since
spouses and cohabitees of the opposite sex are given statutory
tenancies under the act, eliminating homosexual partners from
this category seems to be against its intent. More unique rela-
tionships like those of Joram Developments257 and Sefton Hold-
ings25 8 were also denied recognition as families by the courts, de-
spite being permanent, stable, and mutually interdependent.
Again, people involved in these types of relationships will be ex-
cluded from succeeding to a statutory tenancy, and it seems un-
likely that these diverse-relationship families will even be able
to obtain the lesser protection of an assured tenancy.259
One of the most dramatic changes2 0 is the elimination of
children from the category of those who can inherit a statutory
tenancy. Children have traditionally been included by British
courts as having primary rights to succession. Under the new
regulation, however, children can only inherit an assured ten-
ancy as a member of the tenant's family. This change in the law
will obviously cut off long-term tenancies and return housing to
the open market quickly. Indeed, all the legislative changes re-
garding succession rights have this purpose. Nevertheless, it is
notable that the lower courts in Great Britain have recognized
people unrelated by blood or marriage as having rights to inherit
a tenancy.262 This is an encouraging sign; in New York State the
lower courts were also the first to recognize diverse-family
relationships. 263
In contrast to Great Britain's legislation, New York State
appears to be heading towards a very liberal interpretation of
256. See Harrogate, [1986] 16 Faro. 359.
257. See Joram Developments Ltd. v. Sharrott, [1979] 1 W.L.R. 1; [1975] 2 All E.R.
12; [1979] 1 W.L.R. 928; [1979] 2 All E.R. 1084 (H.L.(E.)).
258. See Sefton Holdings Ltd. v. Cairns, [1988] 18 Faro. 164.
259. See Housing Act, 1988, ch. 50, § 39 & sched. 4; see also supra notes 77-79.
260. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
261. See supra note 92.
262. See Sefton Holdings, [1988] 18 Faro. 164.
263. See supra notes 234-35.
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the definition of family. The recent Braschi decision as well as
the pending legislation regarding succession rights are clear in-
dicators that New York State is recognizing that most families
are not nuclear ones. In order to insure that people who are enti-
tled to rent-regulated housing are able to inherit, the courts and
legislature have expanded the definition of family to include
those who are not related by blood or marriage. 8 4 Since New
York is only one jurisdiction in the United States, it remains
unclear how the other states with rent regulations will define
family, and whether they will expand the traditional defini-
tion.265 The general trend in landlord-tenant law, however; is to-
wards more rights for tenants. 6 Therefore, it seems likely that
the succeeding legislation in other jurisdictions may follow New
York's lead.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
Great Britain has taken a dramatic step in diminishing te-
nants' rights with the 1988 Act. This move towards eliminating
rent control and the severe restrictions on succession rights to
statutory tenancies will make decontrol possible. 7 For some
time, however, there will be people who are entitled to statutory
tenancies. Since the underlying social purpose of rent regula-
tions was to prevent evictions of those who deserved to inherit
the dwelling, it seems only fair that this category of inheritors
should not be limited only to spouses and cohabitees of the op-
posite sex. Those who have established a family, even if it is not
one that is widely recognized, should be able to pass on a ten-
ancy to those with whom they have established a long-term de-
voted relationship. This should include homosexual couples, as
well as platonic friendships and roommates if they are mutually
264. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
265. Cases that discuss definition of family and may indicate trends in United
States law are zoning cases which have expanded the definition of family. In Moore, the
Supreme Court invalidated a city ordinance which barred extended families from living
in a single unit and found that the scope of the privacy right in family matters extended
to families comprised of close relatives who lived together out of choice or necessity. 431
U.S. 505. See also supra note 9.
266. See Nash v. City of Santa Monica, 37 Cal.3d 97, 688 P.2d 894, 207 Cal. Rptr.
285 (1984) (landlord not allowed to destroy his rental housing).
267. The Housing Act 1988 has been described as another triumph for "Thatcher-
ism" in that it brought about a change in landlord-tenant law that would have been
unthinkable 10 years ago. See Lewis, Looking Back Over Half a Decade, 140 NEw L.J.
63, 64 (Jan. 19, 1990).
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interdependent. The elderly population of Great Britain is ris-
ing; elderly friends who have decided to live together for com-
panionship or economics should not be deterred by the threat of
losing their homes.268
Since the majority of families in Great Britain do not fall
within the definition of the nuclear family, 269 basic principles of
fairness dictate that Parliament should acknowledge families
that lack the distinguishing characteristics of the traditional nu-
clear one and grant these couples succession rights to tenancies.
Homosexual couples should also be recognized by the legislature
as families. One possible solution is to allow homosexual couples
the right to a domestic partnership. With this type of legal
recognition, a homosexual couple would meet the language of
the statute. Domestic partnership laws could also be extended to
include other diverse family relationships. This would also elimi-
nate litigation over various and inconsistent definitions of family
in the court system.
Although the New York State courts have struck a powerful
blow for the rights of diverse-relationship families,271 this is only
a tiny step forward. The response to the Braschi decision by the
legislature has been positive. Legislation is currently pending
that would clearly allow unrelated people to succeed to tenan-
cies. Also in the wake of Braschi, former New York City Mayor
Edward Koch signed an order officially recognizing the domestic
partnerships of city employees. 2  New York Governor Mario
268. See South Northamptonshire, [1987] 1 W.L.R. 1433; [1987] 3 All E.R. 831
(C.A.), petition allowed, [1988] 1 W.L.R. 319 (H.L.(E.)). Here the court warned the eld-
erly not to move into the homes of others because of the risk of giving up secure accom-
modation and finding themselves homeless if the tenant dies within a year of the move.
Id. at 833. Elderly people might move for companionship or economic reasons and not be
able to prove that they are a member of the family in order to preserve their homes. See
Bainham, South Northamptonshire District Council v. Power (1987), 138 NEw L.J. 19
(Jan. 22, 1988).
269. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
270. In this Note, domestic partnership means a relationship between two people
who live together but are not legally married. This includes heterosexual couples as well
as homosexual couples. Domestic partnerships enable unmarried couples to gain marital
rights extended only to married couples. See infra note 272.
271. See Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 201, 543 N.E.2d at 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 784; see also
supra notes 227-42 and accompanying text.
272. N.Y. Times, July 7, 1989, at Al, col. 1. This executive order gives city employ-
ees official recognition to domestic partnerships that have been established between two
people (they must both be 18 years old and have lived together for at least one year).
They will be entitled for bereavement leave in the event of the death of a domestic
partner or the death of a child or a parent of a domestic partner. United Press Int'l, Aug.
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Cuomo has announced his intention to sign a bill that would
give homosexuals the right to succession to rent-regulated hous-
ing.2 73 Although these changes reflect a sensitivity to the needs
of diverse-relationship families, more changes could be enacted
by state as well as federal legislatures. For example, couples who
are in a domestic partnership could have benefits equal to those
of married couples. Finally, homosexuals could be given the op-
tion of having a legal marriage.
VII. CONCLUSION
In July 1989 New York State's Court of Appeals announced,
in a controversial opinion, that the surviving partner of a homo-
sexual couple had succession rights to their rent-regulated apart-
ment. 4 The court also defined the partner's prior relationship
as a family under the state's rent control laws. 5 This decision
follows two decades of increased landlord-tenant legislation in
the United States that dramatically favors tenants. Six months
before the Braschi decision, Great Britain enacted wide-ranging
new legislation that changed seventy years of rent regulations
that favored tenants to regulations which enabled landlords to
easily regain possession of dwellings as well as to charge in-
creased rents. This legislation is the result of the British Gov-
ernment's stated desire to decontrol housing and to charge mar-
7, 1989. Five other cities provide bereavement leave for domestic partners of municipal
employees: Los Angeles; Madison, Wisconsin; San Francisco; Seattle; and Takoma Park,
Maryland. Isaacson, supra note 8, at 102, col. 1.
Los Angeles, West Hollywood, Berkeley, and Santa Cruz all have passed domestic
partnership ordinances which provide certificates authenticating relationships between
heterosexual and homosexual couples who are living together. L.A. Times, July 26, 1989,
at 7, col. 5. A similar ordinance in San Francisco was rejected in November 1989, after
opposition from religious groups. Isaacson, supra note 8, at 101, col. 1. In November 1990
San Francisco voters approved an ordinance that would allow couples to register as do-
mestic partners, opening up the possibility that nonmarried partners may be able to
obtain marital and family benefits. The Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, Daily Labor Report,
DLR No. 217, p. A-11 (Nov. 7, 1990).
The spread of AIDS has been only one impetus in the push among gay couples for
medical coverage, bereavement-leave policies, pension rules, and hospitalization visita-
tion rights. Since 30-40% of an employee's compensation comes from fringe benefits, gay
couples are discriminated against because they do not have the option to marry and
therefore get coverage. Isaacson, supra note 8, at 101, cols. 1-3. Only three Californian
cities offer health benefits to the domestic partners of municipal employees: Berkeley,
Santa Cruz, and West Hollywood. Id. at 102, col. 1.
273. See supra note 197.
274. See Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 201, 543 N.E.2d at 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 784.
275. Id.
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ket rates for housing.276 At this time, it appears that American
tenants are the winners in the battle over succession rights to
rent-regulated housing and British tenants are the losers. It re-
mains unclear, however, where these diverging paths in land-
lord-tenant law will lead.
One of the main elements of rent regulation is security of
tenure and the ability to pass on a tenancy to those who share
the home. Succession rights to rent-regulated housing have tra-
ditionally been awarded to spouses and members of the tenant's
family. The State of New York is expanding that definition to
include diverse-relationship families; this is a direct result of a
reality of family life in the United States. Although the statistics
reporting the shift from nuclear families to more unique, di-
verse-relationship families are not as dramatic for Great Britain
as they are for the United States, 7 they are significant and will
probably increase. It seems likely that there will be political
pressure as well as economic pressure to return to rent controls.
Five years ago, the New York State courts and legislature tried
to narrow the definition of those who could succeed to rent-sta-
bilized housing.278 This more restrictive legislation was the be-
ginning of court challenges and political pressure to expand the
definition of family. Whether a similar result will occur in Great
Britain poses an interesting question.
For most people in the United States and Great Britain, di-
versity is the hallmark of contemporary family life, and the legal
definition of family should change to reflect this diversity.
Jane Drummey
276. See supra note 267.
277. See supra note 8.
278. See supra notes 191-94.
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